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The Double Account System in Nineteenth Century U.K. Railways: An Analysis 
from an Accounting Theory Perspective 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the extent to which our knowledge of modern systems oriented 
accounting theories can explain the shortcomings in nineteenth century financial reporting 
as carried out by the railway companies. The work is not intended to be a thesis on history. 
Nor is it a thesis on accounting theories. Rather, the work looks at historical events from the 
perspective of a modern accountant. The two main questions addressed by the thesis are 
whether it is feasible to use modern systems oriented accounting theories to investigate 
and explain the historical events covered in this study and whether the Double Account 
System achieved its aims. The paper contains a brief outline of the development and 
collapse of the UK railway companies in the mid-nineteenth century. The paper then 
considers the purpose of accounting and whether it is merely a measuring tool or a social 
instrument. The place of accounting within the social context is considered and concludes 
that accounting has developed into a social instrument. The work then examines the railway 
companies’ accounting system, The Double Account System. The paper looks at the origin 
and development of the system and explains its workings. As part of this investigation the 
paper considers the aims of the Double Account System and considers whether the system 
achieved its aims or not. The thesis then examines three accounting theories that have been 
called system oriented theories and relates the concepts in the theories to the accounting 
reports of the nineteenth century railway companies in the United Kingdom. The theories 
examined are Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory. The paper 
concludes that it is feasible to use modern systems oriented accounting theories to 
investigate and explain the historical events covered in the study. The work also concludes 
that the Double Account System did achieve what it was meant to achieve but that the aims 
of the system were limited, especially when viewed through the lens of modern accounting 
theories and concepts. 
 
 
1 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an outline of the thesis.  
It provides an outline of the problem to be examined, states the research objectives and 
research questions and provides the motivation for and significance of the study. 
 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
 
 
     1.1.1 The Industrial Revolution 
 
The Industrial Revolution had no specific beginning date but began its evolution during the 
second half of the eighteenth century. It was a time when Britain gradually moved from being 
an agricultural, manual labour economy to one in which machinery was becoming a major 
means of production. This change resulted in not only an expanding middle class but also a 
greater need for basic minerals and metals such as iron and coal, a need which grew 
commensurate with the rapid increase in output generated by the machinery (Montagna 1981). 
     1.1.2 Before the Railway System 
Moving this iron and coal around Britain was difficult because the roads in the 18
th
 century 
were not paved. This made the transportation of heavy loads an onerous task, especially in 
wet weather. An answer to this problem was the construction of canals, which became the 
liquid highways of the early Industrial Revolution (Montagna 1981). 
The Bridgewater Canal has been described as Britain’s first canal. The first section was 
opened on 17
th
 July 1761 to carry the coal from a mine owned by The Duke of Bridgewater 
(London Canal Museum) 
The Duke had introduced a Private Bill to Parliament in 1759 enabling him to raise the capital 
needed to acquire land and construct the canal.
1
 Further Bills were introduced to Parliament to 
extend the scheme and by the time of its completion in 1776 it had become the first of many 
canals built in Britain by the end of the century (London Canal Museum). 
                                                 
1
 A Private Bill is one introduced to the Parliament of Britain by an individual MP. Such a Bill is meant to 
secure powers for an individual or organization above the general law. For example, the Private Bill introduced 
by the Duke of Bridgewater sought the power to obtain land to be used in the construction of the Bridgewater 
Canal. This is not to be confused with a Private Member’s Bill which is introduced to Parliament by an 
individual MP with the intention that the resultant Act will apply to the society as a whole. 
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     1.1.3 The Coming of the Railways 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the demand for coal in Britain was so great that it could 
not be met by the canal system of transportation. Coal production had grown from a little over 
two million tons per annum at the turn of the century to more than fifteen million tons per 
annum by 1829 (Montagna 1981). However, it was not until 1804 that Cornish mining 
engineer Richard Trevithick developed a steam powered locomotive.
2
 Trevithick’s machines 
were used to haul coal from mines. Montagna states that prior to this coal was, firstly, moved 
by human muscle power by hauling baskets of coal along horizontal tunnels then up a vertical 
shaft. Later the horizontal movement through tunnels was speeded up by using ponies and 
carts on rails. Still later, tramways using cast iron rails were used in several British mines. By 
1800 more than two hundred miles of tramway were in use in coal mines (Montagna 1981). 
The Stockton and Darlington Railway, which opened in 1825, was the first line to carry both 
freight and passengers. Prior to that, railways, powered by horses, were only used to carry 
freight. These railways were called Tramways and by 1800 approximately two hundred miles 
of tramway track serviced coal mines (Montagna 1981). 
In 1829 the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company conducted the ‘Rainhill Trials’ with 
the aim of finding the best locomotive design of the day. ‘The Rocket’, designed by the 
English civil and mechanical engineer George Stephenson, assisted by his son Robert and 
Henry Booth, won the Trials and revolutionised steam powered locomotion. 
The Liverpool and Manchester Railway began in 1830 with a forty-mile track connecting the 
cities; by 1841 there were 1,300 miles (2,080 kms.) of track in Britain. By 1852 there were 
approximately 7,000 miles (11,200 kms.) of track (Edwards 1985; Montagna 1981). 
The creation and running of the railways was left by the conservative government of the day 
to the private sector. This idea was in line with the laissez faire economic theory originating 
in France in the eighteenth century with The Physiocrats, French economists who opposed the 
policy of Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) the French controller-general of finance under 
Louis XIV. Colbert’s aim was to micro-manage the French economy so as to accumulate as 
much gold as possible for the national treasury and control overseas trade (Dewberry 2012). 
The argument of The Physiocrats was, inter alia, that the imposition of tariffs and close 
                                                 
2
 The principles of steam power had been known since ancient times. The Greek mathematician and engineer, 
Hero of Alexander (c10AD – 70AD) described the Aeolipile, the first recorded steam engine. The Roman 
architect Vitruvius mentioned the use of the Aeolipile approximately one hundred years earlier in his treatise on 
Latin and Greek architecture, “De Architectura” now known as “The Ten Books of Architecture” 
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regulation of the economy inhibited the growth of agriculture and industry (Dewberry 2012). 
This argument was supported by Adam Smith in his 1776 work, ‘The Wealth of Nations’ 
(Smith 1784).  
Smith discusses the expenses of a sovereign or commonwealth In Book V of his work. These 
expenses are: 
1. expenditure in relation to defence of the realm; 
2. expenditure in relating to the administration of justice; 
3. expenditure on public works and institutions that would not be carried out by an 
individual because no profit could be made in the endeavour and 
4. the expense of supporting the dignity of the sovereign (i.e. expenses of running the 
court). 
Under laissez faire thinking the government would best serve the economy by restricting its 
expenditure to those areas listed above. 
The ideas put forward by Smith (1784) constituted the prevailing economic thought among 
the business community and other educated people for the next one hundred years or so after 
the publication of ‘The Wealth of Nations’.  
As private rather than government ventures, the first rail companies were each incorporated 
by their own Act of parliament; they were, in effect, public companies formed by Private 
Bills, as had been the case with the canal companies. 
     1.1.4 Collapse of the Railways 
Moving goods around Britain during a period of high economic activity, these companies 
appear prima facie to have represented sound investments—yet in the mid-nineteenth century 
they began to collapse.  
Odlyzko (2010) states that there is a notable lack of historical material written about the cause 
of this collapse, beginning in 1847, especially when compared to other economic failures such 
as The Tulip Mania of 1636, economic panics of 1819, 1825 and 1837 or the Wall Street 
Crash of 1929.  
Campbell (2009) points out that the investors of the day were unable to predict the Irish 
famine or the Commercial Crisis of 1847 and in the same way would not have been able to 
predict the fall of the railways. Campbell also performed a series of econometric tests 
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analysing the relationship between railway share prices and dividends from 1843 to 1850. He 
found ‘a positive and significant relationship between the dividend paid by a company and the 
share price at which it traded, through both the boom and bust in prices’ (Campbell, 2009, 
p.3).  
Campbell (2009) also indicates that it was the share price that followed the dividend. That is, 
a higher dividend caused a rise in the share price. He also states that the railways had a 
‘significantly lower dividend yield than non-railways, implying a relatively higher 
price…between 1843 and 1846’ (p. 4). This lower yield, Campbell goes on to say, may be due 
to ‘mispricing…or expectations of dividend growth’ (p. 4). He concludes that the dividend 
did have a big influence on share prices but that investors ‘seem to have been unable to 
forecast the longer-term dividend changes’ (p. 5). 
Odlyzko (2010) however, brings up three important points that the average nineteenth century 
investor, he argues, could not have known: 
i. In the mid 1840’s the number of miles of track authorized annually by the British 
Parliament through the passing of Private Bills for the formation of rail companies 
peaked at more than four thousand. (not all was built) 
ii. In 1847 annual investment in railway capital reached a peak of approximately £44 
million. 
iii. Railway companies’ average share price index peaked in 1845; the index was 
below 60 in 1830, was above 160 in the mid-1840s but by 1850 had dropped back 
to its 1830 level. 
The picture painted by Campbell’s article and Odlyzko’s book resembles what would now be 
called a ‘bubble’ – high economic activity in anticipation of high returns on investment 
(Campbell 2009, Odlyzko 2010). Odlyzko (2010) likens the passing of so many Private Bills 
(see i above) with the number of IPOs during the Internet Bubble of the late 1990s in the 
United States. 
It is therefore arguable that the collapse of the nineteenth century railways was a bubble that 
burst. The lack of literature on this topic, as stated by Odlyzko (2010), makes it difficult to 
assess the reasons for the fall. In any case, this thesis is not an attempt to explain in detail why 
these railway companies failed; rather it is an attempt at exploring the linkage between 
modern accounting theories and history.  
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1.1.5 The Double Account System 
The actual workings of this accounting system will be explained in chapter four. However, an 
indication as to why it evolved as it did can be gleaned from the following.  
The earliest Railway Act (1801) was in relation to the Surrey Iron Railway (Edwards 1985). 
This railway was built from Wandswoth to Croydon and opened on 26 July 1803. It carried 
only freight, no passengers and the carriages were pulled by horses, mules and donkeys 
(Surrey Iron Railway).  
The Act of 1801 decreed that the Surrey Iron Railway was to use all money raised by virtue of 
the Act to pay all costs associated with the Act and any residue was to be appropriated to 
purchasing land and making and maintaining the railway and other works and no other use 
(Edwards 1985). This statutory requirement, with its stewardship emphasis, necessitated 
appropriate financial reporting. This study will show that the Double Account System evolved 
as a way of accounting for stewardship as required. However, while the notion of stewardship 
may have been served well by the Double Account System, it may be argued that it 
represented a narrow accountability framework in which other aspects of performance went 
unreported or may have been given inadequate attention. (“Stewardship” and 
“Accountability” will be discussed in chapter 4) For example, the railways were public 
companies with shareholders requiring dividend returns on their investment. The calculation 
of profit was therefore also of importance to the railway managers. However, it seems that 
once the stewardship aspect of reporting was dealt with, the main emphasis of the financial 
reports became the calculation of a distributable profit. While one may argue that this satisfies 
the shareholders in the short term, this thesis will ask if this short term aspect of the reporting 
became the biggest problem of the railways’ reports and that the thinking of the time 
contributed little to overcome this problem. 
 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives 
This section identifies the research problems to be explored in the thesis. It also describes the 
objectives of the work. In order to meet these objectives certain questions must be addressed. 
The section therefore states the research questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. 
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  1.2.1 The Theory/History Linkage 
This research involves an investigation into the collapse of the railway companies of 
nineteenth century Britain from an accounting perspective.  
Odlyzko (2010) states that there is a shortage of literature explaining, in detail, the cause(s) of 
the collapse of British railways in the 1840s. The Literature Review in chapter two supports 
this contention. 
A consequence of this gap in the literature is that there is little (if any) work on examining the 
linkage between modern system oriented accounting theories and the history in question. 
The first objective of this thesis is, therefore, to fill the gap in the existing literature by 
exploring the linkage, if any, between the modern theories and historical events. 
To this end this thesis will explore whether or not certain modern accounting theories can be 
used to identify and explain, either wholly or in part, the weaknesses and flaws in the 
nineteenth century financial reporting by British railway companies. That is, it will consider 
whether or not the prevailing thinking of the day was a large part of the problem and will 
question whether modern accounting theories can be used to clarify why the nineteenth 
century British railway companies failed in spite of a high level of economic activity in 
Britain at that time.  
The study will examine nineteenth century external financial reporting by railway companies. 
To this end the thesis will examine the workings of the Double Account System as explained 
by Edwards (1985), Dicksee (1976), Lee (1975) and Pollins (1991) and will consider whether 
or not these reports were disclosing information that gave, or had the potential to give, a 
warning of the financial troubles that beset the companies. If such disclosure is not found, the 
research will look at what measures could have—and arguably should have—been adopted to 
improve the usefulness of the reports. An example of a financial report prepared in 
accordance with the Double Account System is shown in Appendix One of this thesis. 
     1.2.2 The Double Account System 
The second objective of the study is to analyse the development by the railway companies of 
the Double Account System. 
The Double Account System will be examined in chapter three of this thesis to try to establish 
whether the preparers of the reports viewed the railway companies as a way of generating 
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dividends or whether some other aim was intended. That is, did the reports merely calculate a 
profit (hence potential dividends) or were the managers also interested in reporting to certain 
parties on matters other than profit? That is, were they showing signs of going beyond the 
mandatory reporting requirements that would be in the reports if they were acting in 
accordance with the systems oriented accounting theories discussed in chapter five of this 
thesis? Did the reports deal with the potential conflict that arises when private entities provide 
public services? If so, how was this achieved? Also, to whom were the managers reporting?  
In considering all this, the work will be attempting to answer the question of whether or not 
the Double Account System achieved what it was meant to achieve. Chapter four of this thesis 
will discuss the question of what the reporting arising from the Double Account System were 
meant to achieve. 
We cannot expect the directors of nineteenth century companies to be aware of accounting 
theories from subsequent times. However, what we can do is look back on the history with 
our awareness of accounting theories and, armed with this knowledge, see more clearly if 
there were gaps in the railway companies’ reports and perhaps suggest reasons for these gaps. 
Prima facie the Double Account System can be seen as a good system in that it did the job 
that it was intended to do. But this is the conclusion that we come to if we look at the situation 
with a narrow view. That is, if we only look at what the Double Account System was 
designed to do and ask whether or not it achieved this purpose. This thesis argues that the 
Double Account System was designed to meet legal requirements (Edwards 1975) and 
disclose available profits to shareholders (Dicksee 1976, Lee 1975). But if we broaden our 
outlook and ask if the accounting system of the railways could or should have been disclosing 
more then we may come to a different conclusion. This matter is examined further, especially 
in chapter four of the thesis. 
     1.2.3 Relating Theories to History 
It is not the contention of the study that an accounting system can cause an enterprise to 
succeed or fail. Rather, the thesis will examine the extent to which an awareness or 
consideration of the ideas raised in certain accounting theories could have helped preparers 
produce more informative reports for the shareholders and public. An important point to 
consider here is whether or not the contemporaries of the Double Account System could have 
seen the weaknesses of that accounting system. From the evidence in Edwards (1985) and Lee 
(1975) it seems clear that the legislators were not content with the accounts of the railways. 
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Acts of Parliament such as The Great Western Railway Act 1835 and the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845, sought to tighten regulations on the accounting reports of the 
railways (Lee 1975).  
The study will provide a historical review of the accounting undertaken by the railways as 
they attempted to provide financial reports that were useful to report-users. Particular 
attention will be paid to the Double Account System and what gave rise to that system.  
It is important to note that the railway entities of the nineteenth century were private 
enterprises. However, they were concerned with public projects and can be said to be doing 
what the government of the day might well have done—provide infrastructure and services to 
society. The fact that the operators of these ventures were not the government does not change 
the nature of the services being provided and, it can be argued, should not have changed the 
accounting system or reports. 
     1.2.4 Summary 
The research objectives of this thesis and its research questions can be summarized as 
follows: 
Research Objectives 
The research objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which our knowledge of 
modern system oriented accounting theories can explain the shortcomings in nineteenth 
century financial reporting as carried out by the railway companies. 
Research Questions 
Out of this objective arise the following questions: 
 
1. Is it feasible to use the modern systems oriented accounting theories to investigate and 
explain the historical events covered in this study? 
 
2. Did the Double Account System achieve what it was meant to achieve? 
 
 
1.3 Motivation for and Significance of the Study 
The motivation for this study is to add to the literature in relation to infrastructure and utility 
reporting of the nineteenth century. This will be achieved by investigating the events under 
study through the lens of modern systems oriented accounting theories.  
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 1.3.1 History and Theory 
Accounting history literature (Parker 1990, Edwards 1985, Edwards 1986, Lee 1975, Pollins 
1991, Dicksee 1976) explains, to varying degrees, what happened with the collapse of railway 
companies in the nineteenth century from the accountant’s perspective. Accounting theory 
literature, on the other hand, proposes various theories which may be useful in helping to 
explain historical events. They may be useful because they are concerned with non-mandatory 
disclosure whereas the reporting of the nineteenth century railway companies was primarily 
concerned with mandatory reporting requirements. 
The thesis will attempt to link the two areas, history and accounting theory, first, by providing 
an account of past events and, second, by examining accounting theories and questioning the 
usefulness of these theories in explaining those events. An assumption is made that these 
theories can be applied to the historical events concerned. However, it is important to remain 
open to the possibility that such linkage may not be valid.  
     1.3.2 The Theories 
The theories to be examined are Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional 
Theory.  
The reasons for selecting these particular theories are explained as follows. 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) state that ‘Institutional Theory provides a useful theoretical lens 
through which to view accounting choice in the public sector’ (p.593). They go to say that 
Institutional Theory explains how entities conform to each other and that the aim of this 
conformity is the gaining or maintaining of legitimacy. This is in line with Scott (1987) who 
states that organisations conform to institutional pressures to gain legitimacy.  
This leads us to Legitimacy Theory. According to this theory, legitimacy is a resource like 
any other resource. It, like other resources, is needed by business entities for survival (Deegan 
2006; Tilling 2004).  
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995, p. 52, cited in Deegan, 2006) state that ‘stakeholder theory 
and legitimacy theory are better seen as two (overlapping) perspectives’.  Therefore, if we are 
to consider Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory should also come into the discussion. 
These three theories can also be seen as relating to reporting that goes beyond mandatory 
reporting requirements (Deegan 2006; Gray, Owen & Adams 1996). This thesis will examine 
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whether or not the railway companies met their mandatory requirements (especially 
concerned with stewardship) in relation to their financial reports. The study will then go on to 
examine the question of whether merely complying with legal/statutory requirements was 
enough. In other words, should the directors of the railway entities have been concerned with 
more than just meeting mandatory requirements and disclosing the year’s profit? 
By combining these two broad areas — history and accounting theory — our understanding 
of the nineteenth century events relating to the British railways should be enlarged in terms of 
what occurred and why.  
The thesis will also link these theories to a practical situation and in doing so emphasise their 
importance.  
     1.3.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
The contribution of the thesis lies in the increased knowledge it affords of historical events by 
investigating them through the lens of modern accounting theories. At the same time the work 
will be examining the validity of using the theories to help explain past events. This emphasis 
should be of interest to accounting academics, practitioners and students. 
     1.3.4 Counter Factual History? 
It is important to note that this thesis is not an exercise in counter-factual history.  
Counter-factual history usually asks the question, ‘What if?’ This thesis is not asking, ‘What 
if the railway directors had been aware of modern accounting theories?’ Rather, the study will 
show what the railway entities did in terms of reporting; it will then attempt to add weight to 
the theories by saying that today reporting entities go further than the mandatory reporting 
requirements and do so for the following reasons: 
i. to gain and maintain legitimacy; 
ii. to take account of the various stakeholders and 
iii. to acknowledge that they are conscious of the idea that their firms are part of a 
society, act within and interact with other members of that society. 
This is not counter-factual history. What the work is trying to say is that the three theories 
mentioned earlier describe how modern reports go beyond mandatory requirements. The 
thesis then contrasts that with an example of what can happen when the reporting entities go 
no further than the mandatory minimum in their reporting. 
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     1.3.5 Significance of the Thesis 
Theories cannot tell us what the railway directors had in mind when they were preparing the 
companies’ financial statements. But if we examine those financial reports, doing so with the 
benefit of our knowledge of the theories mentioned in section 1.3.2 of this thesis, we may be 
able to reach some conclusion as to why the reports were produced as they were. 
We shall see in subsequent chapters that, to some extent, the railway entities’ reports were a 
practical attempt at complying with the law. However, the modern reader of financial reports 
would expect that a reporting entity would do more than simply comply with legislation. 
Modern annual reports contain more than mandatory information. The theories examined in 
this thesis help explain why companies report what they do report. If we look at the historical 
reports with the same or similar expectation as we view modern ones we should be able to see 
more clearly where the nineteenth century reports are, or are not, of a higher than mandatory 
standard. 
Applying these theories in an examination of historical reporting gives us another way of 
exploring history. Consideration of the theories broadens our review of the historical events. 
We are not simply seeing what happened. We are looking at history from the viewpoint of one 
who can apply modern thinking to past events and, in doing so, can gain a clearer idea of not 
just what happened but why it happened. Without applying these theories we are only reading 
historical facts; by applying the theories to the facts we force ourselves to consider the facts in 
a different context. We see the nineteenth century financial statements being prepared by the 
directors without their applying of the thought that goes into the preparation of modern 
financial reports. 
The significance of this study is, therefore, that it can help clarify our view of the historical 
events mentioned previously. The work also emphasises the importance of having a sound 
knowledge of accounting theories in the practice and evaluation of financial accounting 
reporting.  
The literature review in chapter two reveals a gap in the literature in this area – no other 
author appears to have attempted to investigate and then explain the financial reports of the 
nineteenth century British railway entities with reference to modern accounting theories. This 
thesis attempts to fill that gap. 
Having said that, the idea of viewing history through a modern theory is not new. Riaz (2009) 
sought to explain the Global Financial Crisis by looking at the events through an analysis of 
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Institutional Theory. However, no article has attempted to view the railway collapses of the 
nineteenth century from the accounting theory perspective.  
1.4 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the thesis. 
It has given a brief outline of the coming of the Industrial Revolution and the advent of the 
railways that took over from the canals as the main form of transportation of freight and, 
subsequently, passengers in the nineteenth century in Britain. It has also stated that in the 
middle of the nineteenth century the railways began to collapse despite the need for them 
caused by the industrial activity that was developing throughout Britain. 
The Introduction has shown that this thesis will examine the railways and their downfall, not 
from the historian’s point of view, but from the perspective of the accountant.  
The thesis will examine the accounting system of the railways (The Double Account System) 
and will examine that system through the lens of modern systems oriented accounting 
systems. The thesis is not saying that the accounting system caused the collapse of the 
railways; rather, it is investigating whether or not we can gain a clearer view of historical 
events by looking at them through the eyes of the modern accountant. 
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2. Review of Literature 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a review of the literature relating to the topic of this 
thesis. 
The title of this thesis, ‘Collapse of the nineteenth Century UK Railways: An Analysis of 
Historical Events from an Accounting Theory Perspective,’ indicates that the work is 
concerned with history and accounting theories. However, the study is neither an exercise in 
historical research nor is it entirely concerned with a detailed study of accounting theory or 
theories. Rather, the work is designed to look at an historical event, the collapse of British 
railways in the nineteenth century, from the perspective of modern accounting theories. 
The main areas to be examined in the thesis are: 
1. The nature of financial accounting, especially in relation to the social aspects of 
accounting. 
2. The development and workings of the accounting system used by the railways, 
namely, the Double Account System. 
3. Three systems oriented accounting theories, viz. Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder 
Theory and Institutional Theory. 
The topic of the nature of accounting is potentially a large study in itself and this thesis is not 
intended to be a detailed examination of accountancy from the sociologist’s perspective. 
Rather, the thesis will consider whether accounting is merely a measuring tool or a social tool. 
That is, a tool used by society to achieve an end. This point is important because if accounting 
is just a measuring tool the remainder of the thesis become redundant. 
The thesis is not an attempt to explain the causes of the collapse of the railways. The study 
does not suggest that the accounting system used by the companies in question caused the 
collapse of the businesses.  
Nor is the work an exercise in counter factual history. Because this is essentially a thesis in 
the area of accounting it looks at the historical situation from an accountancy point of view. 
The thesis will discuss three modern accounting theories. It is not the intention to provide a 
thorough examination of these theories. That would be far beyond the scope of a study such as 
15 
 
this. The theories will be used to examine the historical events from the accountant’s point of 
view by allowing us to view the railway companies through the lens of accounting theory. 
This is not to say that the managers of the nineteenth century companies should have been 
thinking in terms of these theories. Rather, the concept behind the thesis is that keeping 
modern thinking in mind allows a twenty-first century reader to obtain a clearer picture of the 
situation that prevailed in the nineteenth century. This happens because as a reader 
contemplates the history having modern thinking in mind allows a comparison between the 
past and present to take place in the mind’s eye. This comparison allows a clearer picture of 
the history to form in the mind of the reader. 
The literature reviewed for this thesis was selected if it contributed to the overall aim of the 
work as described above. 
Literature sought regarding the social aspects of accounting mainly fell into the area of 
sociology. The works of sociologists and philosophers were used to describe society and the 
way business entities fit into it. The thesis uses a mix of classical works and modern writers. 
Literature concerning the historical events needed to be clear and well referenced so as to 
ensure that the work was as objective as possible.  
In relation to the accounting theories, works were used that provided information about the 
theories that best illustrated the relevance of those theories to the aim of this thesis. These 
writings may or may not have been the seminal works on the theories. The reason for this is 
that this thesis is not meant to provide a thorough explanation of the theories. It is assumed 
that the reader has at least basic knowledge of the theories. This work shows how the theories 
relate to and can be used to clarify our understanding of the historical events mentioned 
earlier. 
 
2.2 Accounting History 
 
This thesis is not intended to be a detailed examination of the historical events relating to the 
collapse of the British Railways in the middle of the nineteenth century. Rather, it is an 
accounting thesis that looks at the events through the eyes of a modern accountant and views 
the situation through the lens of modern accounting theories. 
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There are several references that deal with the actual events of the coming of the railways and 
their failure (Edwards, 1985; Edwards 1986; Parker 1990). A brief summation of the events is 
found in chapter one of this thesis. 
What we need to do in the remainder of the thesis is examine the events from the accounting 
perspective. This will be done by an examination of the accounting system used by the 
nineteenth century British railway companies, that is, The Double Account System. 
The earliest Railway Act (1801) stated in s.35 that the Surry Iron Railway was to use all 
money raised by virtue of the Act to pay all costs associated with the Act and then the balance 
of that money was to be used to make and maintain the railway and ‘no other use’ (Edwards 
1985 p. 22). 
Edwards then goes to say that it became common for a clause like this to be inserted into the 
private statutes of subsequent railway companies. 
We can see from this that the Railway Acts required financial reporting that accounted for 
stewardship (Edwards 1985; Parker 1990). Although this was achieved under the Double 
Account System, the financial reports did not disclose the true financial position of the 
entities as on-going enterprises. This is because they were prepared on a cash basis and only 
sometimes contained an allowance for what a modern accountant would call depreciation 
(Edwards 1985; Edwards 1986). It can therefore be argued that the system was created to do 
only part of the job that was really needed, according to the modern viewpoint on the 
requirements of financial reporting. 
Edwards’ reference to s.35 of the Railway Act 1801 is part of his explanation of the 
development and use of the Capital Account in the Double Account System. What is not 
clearly stated in Edwards (1985) is that some railway companies did over spend the capital 
they had raised. The copy of the accounts published by The London and Birmingham Railway 
dated 31 December 1838 (see Appendix One) clearly shows that the Capital Account is in 
deficit. That is, the company had spent more than £40,000 in excess of the capital raised. This 
situation is referred to in the article Railway Maps and Documents and is interesting in the 
context of the discussion on Institutional Theory (see Chapter Five of this thesis). The fact 
that the railways appear to have become powerful enough to contravene s.35 of the Railways 
Act is interesting when we consider the idea raised by Riaz (2009) who states that entities can 
become large and powerful enough to influence society’s institutions rather than the other 
way around. Riaz’s point is that while Institutional Theory states that a society moulds 
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entities, (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Deegan, 2006; Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004) a 
powerful entity can reach the stage where it is influencing the society’s institutions.  
We must remember that the railways of the nineteenth century were companies in the private 
sector that were acting in the public sector. Rugers (2010) believes that the public sector—or, 
as in the case of the early railways, private companies performing public sector services—
needs to have reports that have a different emphasis than private sector accounting. He argues 
that ‘increasing the usefulness of financial reports in the public sector will likely need to 
extend beyond what is included in traditional financial statements’ (Rugers 2010 p. 20). It is 
interesting to note that this statement, published in 2010, is set in the future tense, suggesting 
that in the author’s mind there still is a need for improvement in the reports of public sector 
entities. One could argue that if Rugers has a valid point in relation to modern public sector 
reports then his point may have been just as valid in the nineteenth century and we should not 
be surprised that the financial statements of the nineteenth century would be seen as lacking to 
a modern reader. 
The need for regulating the accounts and reports of the nineteenth century railway companies 
was in the mind of authorities but their stated reason for this regulation appears different from 
what we might expect today.  The Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Audit of 
Railway Accounts (1849) (cited in Parker 1990) states that the railway companies’ ‘existence 
has depended upon the Legislature; and to that Legislature, therefore, they must be held in a 
peculiar degree responsible’. Parker (1990) also refers to the vice-president of the Board of 
Trade who, in 1868, pointed out an important difference between railway companies created 
by private acts of Parliament and ordinary companies formed under the general Companies 
Act of 1844 onwards:  
Very few of the latter had compulsory powers granted to them by Parliament – a characteristic which 
alone would warrant Parliamentary interference in the internal concerns of railway companies (Hansard 
1868 191:1539 in Parker, 1990, p.56).  
However, this recognized need for regulation seems to have produced little in the way of 
improved financial reporting. Legislation was proposed but often not passed (Edwards 1985; 
Parker 1990; Lee 1975). The reasons for this rejection of legislative attempts range from the 
fact that managers of railway companies were often also members of Parliament to the fact 
that politicians were still of the view that it was wrong for governments to interfere with the 
workings of private enterprise (Edwards 1985). Both of these points (especially the former) 
are completely at odds with modern thinking. As to the latter point, Edwards seems to state 
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that this is what the politicians believed and leaves it at that. An argument missed by Edwards 
is that although these railway companies were in the private sector they were providing a 
service that would often be carried out by the public sector. It is therefore arguable that the 
government of the day had a right, even an obligation, to have some form of control over the 
companies. This argument gains strength when coupled with the Hansard reference above. 
That is, the government can be said to have the right of interference because the railway 
companies were created by parliament and, in the process, were granted powers not available 
to a company not so formed and the companies were performing what can be argued is a 
public service. 
Even attempts at legislating, in 1849, to have the railway companies’ reports subject to a 
Government audit were not successful (Lee 1975; Edwards 1985). According to Edwards 
(1985), auditors usually were amateur at best. Moreover, when legislation was passed in 
relation to auditing in 1845 the two auditors required to be appointed by the shareholders had 
to be shareholders themselves but not office bearers of the company (Parker 1990). The 
Monteagle Committee, in its third report in 1849 stated that an audit should be ‘freed, as far 
as possible, from all partial influences’ (Parker 1990, p. 68). The Committee did not actually 
state that the auditor(s) had to be totally independent (Parker 1990). 
A further indication of the thinking in the nineteenth century can be obtained from Odlyzko 
(2010). He states that activities 
‘such as manipulating prices, insider trading, “naked short-selling”, disseminating false 
information…that today would place investors and executives in jail (if detected and proved), were not 
illegal in the laissez faire atmosphere of the 1840s’ (Odlyzko 2010, p.193). 
We can see from even the brief examples above that the general thinking of the nineteenth 
century in relation to financial reports and auditing are completely at odds with modern 
practice and thinking. We do need to view the events in this light if we are to come to a better 
understanding of what happened. With this in mind, the present study will require perusal, to 
the extent possible, of copies of reports published by nineteenth century British railway 
companies. An example of a railway financial report can be seen in Appendix One of this 
thesis. 
Edwards (1985) provides a general study of how the Double Account System evolved. In his 
paper he states that no one person or company created the system; rather, it evolved from the 
attempts of the managers of railway companies to comply with the stewardship requirements 
of the acts of parliament that created the entities. The example of a report based on the Double 
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Account System contained in Edwards’ paper and reproduced in this thesis as Appendix One, 
clearly shows that the company accounted for every penny raised through the issue of shares 
or debentures and, with equal clarity, disclosed where that money had been spent. 
If Edwards (1985) describes the evolution of the Double Account System, a subsequent paper 
by the same author provides a specific example of a flaw in that system and the attempts to 
overcome the problem. Edwards (1986) looks at the problem of not providing for the 
maintenance and replacement of the non-current assets of the railway companies. The Double 
Account System used mainly cash-based accounting, often omitting depreciation from the 
financial statements. Edwards (1986) examines in detail the various methods used to attempt 
to provide for the maintenance and replacement of railway lines and rolling stock. However, 
he claims that the attempts to include depreciation in the financial statements were short-lived 
mainly, if not entirely, due to the need to maintain the reported profit (and therefore 
dividends) of the companies. Edwards (1986) then reviews the Railway Companies Act 1886 
and the measures in that Act that were designed to improve the reporting of the valuations of 
non-current assets. This is relevant to the present study because of its insight into the attitudes 
of the preparers of the financial statements and the extent to which those attitudes may have 
brought about the failure of the companies. 
The notion of capital maintenance is examined in detail by Arden and Aiken (2005) in their 
review of legal cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which the 
concept of capital maintenance and the distributions to shareholders were at question. Arden 
and Aiken (2005) ask why the judges decided that some accounting methods were satisfactory 
in relation to this topic whereas others were not. They then argue that the British judges 
adhered to guiding principles when assessing accounting procedures in relation to capital 
maintenance and distribution. At the centre of these principles was, they claim, the idea that 
different firms have different planning horizons and ways of assessing risk. This resulted in 
the judge in the case of Lee v Neuchatel Asphalt Company (1889) concluding that the 
directors of a company could make distributions from a company even if this meant the 
erosion of the capital if the company had a shorter planning horizon—in other words, if the 
company was not intended to be in existence for a long time capital maintenance was of little 
importance. 
This way of thinking appears to have been common during the 19th century. The railway 
companies were often distributing the full amount of the profits calculated on a purely cash 
basis (Hendriksen 1970; Lee 1975; Edwards 1985). Edwards (1986) makes the point that, 
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early in the existence of some of the railway companies, they included a provision for 
depreciation in an attempt to provide for the replacement of rolling stock, but not rail lines. 
However, as indicated above, this practice was soon abandoned because replacements were 
generally treated as expenses, thus lowering the profits of one year, while the intervening 
years carried no such charge, thus resulting in more years of higher profits and higher 
dividends. 
The papers referred to above combine to paint a reasonably clear picture of what was 
happening in the 19th century railway companies and some underlying reasons for this. An 
even clearer picture can be obtained when we remember that the prevailing economic thought 
in the 19th century was influenced by the economist Adam Smith who published the first 
substantial work on economics (Smith 1784). In the first chapter of Book Two of his “Wealth 
of Nations”, Smith divided the notion of capital into two main categories: Circulating Capital, 
which he describes as being ‘employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and 
selling them again with a profit’(Smith 1784 p. 245); and Fixed Capitals, described as 
‘employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of 
trade, or in suchlike things as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters, or 
circulating any further’ (Smith 1784, p. 246). Edwards (1985) observes that this distinction 
between fixed and circulating capital was stressed by economists for over one hundred years 
after the publication of Smith’s work and seems to fit in with the structure of the Double 
Account System which disclosed fixed capital in the capital account and circulating capital in 
the general balance sheet. 
 In looking at more recent examples of infrastructure accounting, Lee and Fisher report that an 
analysis of disclosures made by seventy-three Australian public sector entities operating in 
infrastructure industries reveal a ‘low level of, and considerable diversity in, disclosures, 
particularly relating to the physical condition of infrastructure assets, their maintenance and 
performance measurement’ (Lee & Fisher 2004 p. 349). The survey concerned related to 
entities purely within the public sector. As stated earlier, the railway companies of the 
nineteenth century in Britain were private sector entities providing services that would usually 
be expected to come from the public sector.  This makes Lee and Fisher’s paper relevant to 
this study because it discusses a lack of reporting disclosures within the public sector and the 
railway companies can be said to be private entities operating as though they were public 
enterprises.  
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2.3 Accounting Theory 
Hendriksen (1970) provides the link between railway history and accounting theory. He states 
that the development of the railway industry influenced the development of accounting 
theory. This is because businesses were faced with having to spend large sums to establish the 
business before revenue could be generated. This investment was mainly in large, long-lasting 
assets. However, the assets were long-lasting, not ever-lasting. This highlighted the 
importance of distinguishing between capital and income accounts. 
Hendriksen (1970) goes on to clarify this notion by saying that early in the history of the 
British railways it was common for most, if not all, of the profits (calculated on a cash basis) 
to be distributed as dividends. This pushed up the value of the shares in these companies. 
However, once large assets needed replacing and the large dividends could not be continued 
the value of the shares dropped rapidly. In this Hendriksen is in agreement with Odlyzko 
(2010) and Campbell (2009). 
While there is a vast amount of literature available on accounting theories, this research is 
selective inasmuch as it will look primarily at those theories that may help explain and clarify 
the situation of nineteenth century railway company financial reporting. The three 
contemporary accounting theories selected fall under the umbrella of “Systems-Oriented 
Theories” (Deegan 2006). These theories—namely, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory 
and Institutional Theory—are all related to the task of information disclosure, about which 
this study is concerned. These are not the only theories related to voluntary disclosure. The 
reasoning behind the selection of these particular theories in provided in Chapter Five of this 
thesis. 
The idea of using a contemporary theory to help explain an historic event is not new. Riaz 
(2009) analysed and sought ‘to provide insights into the current global financial crisis’ by 
looking at the situation from an Institutional Theory perspective. He found that the interplay 
between financial industry organizations and institutions was the ‘key to understanding the 
creation of the crisis’ (Riaz 2009, p.1). This paper seeks to look at the situation with the 
railway companies in a similar way. 
The theories looked at in this thesis are described as systems oriented theories. This term was 
first used by Gray Owen and Adams (1996) and refers to the idea that businesses exist in a 
society and that each society is made up of sub-systems. Gray Owen and Adams (1996) are 
using the idea of systems and systems-thinking that was put forward by Von Bertalanffy 
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(1950). The idea is that a system must be considered in its context; it should be considered in 
isolation. This gives a clearer picture of the way the system operates (Gray Owen and Adams 
1996). This idea is also put forward by Deegan (2006) who states that any accounting theory 
cannot be looked at in isolation.  
2.3.1 Legitimacy Theory 
‘Legitimacy Theory asserts that organisations continually seek to ensure that they are 
perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies’ (Deegan 
2006). In this theory, legitimacy is seen as a resource like any other used resource by an entity 
(Deegan 2006, Tilling 2004). Rather than being tangible, this resource is a perception of the 
society in which the entity operates. Managers can gather and maintain this resource by their 
reporting. In relation to the present study, this raises the question of whether the railways tried 
to gather this resource. If so, what benefits if any accrued to them as a result? If not, could this 
in any way have contributed to their failure? It may be impossible to answer these particular 
questions fully but a consideration of them could help in our understanding of why the 
railway companies failed. 
Tilling (2004) breaks Legitimacy Theory down into two layers: Institutional Level and 
Organisational Level. The former refers to how the entity gains legitimacy by its dealing with 
organisations in society as a whole. The latter is concerned with how the management 
operates to establish, maintain, extend and defend its legitimacy. The present study will look 
also at whether the railway companies were active at either or both levels. 
Lindblom (1993) describes legitimacy as a perspective. By this she means that legitimacy is 
held in a business if the society in which the business operates perceives that business to be 
operating legitimately. Deegan (2006), however, refers to legitimacy as a resource. He states 
that an organisation will seek out legitimacy like any other resource and, having gained 
legitimacy, will strive to maintain and enhance that legitimacy. Cowan and Deegan (2011) 
demonstrated this striving for legitimacy when they concluded that certain businesses had 
made increased disclosures relating to their emissions in their annual reports in response to 
the implementation of the National Pollutant Inventory. 
Carpenter and Feroz (1992) also reported an attempt to regain legitimacy in the case the State 
of New York and its decision to adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in 
its financial reporting to outsiders. Interestingly, these researchers noted that social or 
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institutional pressures to adopt GAAP were placed on New York State. This is an example of 
the overlap between Legitimacy Theory and Institutional Theory. 
2.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder Theory is closely related to Legitimacy Theory (Gray, Owen and Adams 1996; 
Deegan 2006). Like Legitimacy Theory, this theory is concerned with gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy. However, it takes that view that an entity either regards all 
stakeholders as equally entitled to be treated fairly or that some stakeholders are more 
important to the entity than others. Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) state that in this second 
limb of the theory the managers will perceive some stakeholders as being more important than 
others and will therefore take this into account when deciding their actions and the disclosure 
of those actions. 
Lindblom (1993), when writing about Legitimacy Theory, refers to stakeholders. She states 
that there is usually not universal agreement in a society as to the legitimacy of an 
organisation. Rather, the organisation establishes relationships with the stakeholders that are 
seen as being of most importance to the organisation. This recognises the overlap between 
Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholders Theory. 
Freeman (cited in Freeman et al 2004) notes that stakeholder theory asks two essential 
questions: 
1. What is the purpose of the firm? 
2. What responsibility does the management have to stakeholders? 
The purpose of the railway companies can be said to be to provide an ongoing service to the 
community. The question of responsibility to stakeholders will require identification of those 
stakeholders and their needs. Insofar as external financial reporting is concerned, as stated 
previously, a first look at the companies’ financial reports suggests that the managers were 
concerned primarily with reporting on stewardship and profits (hence dividends). A closer 
examination of the companies’ annual reports needs to be undertaken to determine whether 
that was the limit of managers’ interest and how far the reports went towards meeting 
stakeholder information needs. 
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2.3.3 Institutional Theory 
Institutional Theory looks at the forms that entities take. Scott (1995) argues that to survive, 
an entity must conform to rules and belief systems held within its environment, that is, the 
society in which it operates, to earn legitimacy. 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) go so far as to state that they believe that all states of U.S.A. will 
adopt GAAP in their external financial reporting. Their 2002 paper examines the adoption of 
GAAP by four American states. They conclude that powerful social pressures will be what 
will cause the remaining states to adopt GAAP. The social pressures they are discussing are 
the pressures described by Di Maggio and Powell (1983) (see below). Carpenter and Feroz 
(2001) identified coercive and normative isomorphic pressures in their research. These terms 
come from Di Maggio and Powell (1983). Coercive Isomorphism concerns political influence 
and Normative Isomorphism relates to professionalization. 
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) see Institutional Theory as ‘a way of thinking about 
formal organization structures and the nature of the historically grounded social processes 
through which these structures develop’ (p508). The implication that society is acting to form 
and mould the organization is interesting. Riaz (2009) suggests that the opposite may occur if 
institutions become powerful enough to influence the institutions with which they operate. He 
calls this ‘reverse legitimacy’ and refers to ‘the ability of powerful business and financial 
organizations today to reverse-legitimate institutions through their own success’ (Riaz 2009, 
p. 3).  
Di Maggio and Powell (1983) spoke about this process of changing and conforming calling it 
“isomorphism”. This term is borrowed from biology, a science in which it means a similarity 
of appearance displayed by organisms having different genotypes. These authors also refer to 
an ‘organizational field’, describing it as a group of entities that produce similar services or 
products and share key suppliers, resources, consumers and regulatory agencies. They go on 
to say that once an organizational field is established four ‘powerful forces emerge that lead 
them to become more similar to one another’ (Di Maggio and Powell 1983, p. 148). The 
British railway companies can be seen as making up an organizational field. The question is 
whether or not any ‘powerful forces’ did act to make the various companies similar to each 
other. If this is the case, did this have any effect on the operations and failure of the entities? 
This thesis will consider whether either of these processes—isomorphism and reverse 
legitimacy—was in evidence with the railway companies.    
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We can see from the above brief analysis that these theories have a great deal of overlap. One 
cannot be considered without taking into account the others and it may be difficult to see 
clearly where the effect of one ends and another starts. A full analysis of these theories is 
beyond the scope of the study but the thesis will use the theories to help explain what 
happened to the railway companies and, perhaps more importantly, why it happened. 
2.4 Accounting as a Social Instrument 
The literature relating to this part of the thesis is mainly in the areas of Sociology, Accounting 
History and Philosophy. Because the thesis is an accounting study this section is not 
extensive. However, it does serve to establish an important point. That is, that accounting has 
developed into a social instrument used by society to control the financial reports issued by 
business entities. 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, accounting served a narrower purpose than it does today. 
According to Lee (1975) accounting prior to the Industrial Revolution was carried out mainly 
by merchants. He states that what the merchants needed was to keep track of their inventory 
and calculate the profit on particular projects. A project may be as simple as the purchase and 
sale of a shipment of inventory. The merchant was concerned as to whether he was selling at a 
profit. Therefore what we nowadays would call Gross Profit would be of utmost importance 
(Lee 1975).  
We can see an example of this type of accounting by examining the ledger of Jachomo 
Badoer (Peragallo 1977). This ledger is described as the ‘only commercial document written 
entirely in Constantinople that has survived…the Turkish conquest of that city’ (Peragallo 
1977, p. 881). The Turkish conquest was in 1453. The ledger covers the period from 
September 1436 to February 1440 and was kept by Jachomo Badoer, a Venetian merchant 
based in Constantinople. His ledger contains simple, single entry records of transactions with 
debtors and creditors but has no formal journal. It is simply a record keeping device. Badoer 
had to report to nobody other than himself so all he was concerned with was keeping track of 
his debtors and creditors and seeing that he was selling at a profit (Peragallo 1977). Badoer 
therefore used accounting to calculate his Gross Profit. To him it must have been a tool used 
to perform calculations. This view of accounting can be traced back to the first known book 
on accounting written by Luca Pacioli, a Venetian monk and mathematician, in 1494. 
Pacioli’s book was actually a five part book on mathematics and one of those parts explained 
accounting as practiced in Venice at that time (Smith 2011). 
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The use of the ledger fits in with the idea expressed by Lee (1975) referred to above. It also 
fits in with the notion that early accounting was meant to be a measuring tool.  
The only time merchants were reporting to other people was when the merchant was in a 
partnership. Then, it was necessary to have reports that were available to other parties (Lee 
1975). But even then, the parties were known to each other, usually, so any additional 
information could be obtained by directly questioning the partner who prepared the report. 
Modern accountants would call such a partnership a Non-Reporting Entity (SAC 1 2011). 
This thesis, however, is concerned more with reporting entities. These are entities from which 
business information is only readily available through published financial statements (SAC 1 
2011). Such entities must use accounting standards in the preparation and presentation of their 
financial statements. These standards are referred to in the Companies Act 2001as being the 
method to be used in preparing such accounts.  
In looking at the social aspect of accounting we must keep in mind that organisations exist in 
a society and do operate in isolation. This is moving into the area of Sociology. This is not a 
thesis on Sociology but some awareness of sociological concepts needs to be considered.  
According to the sociologist Emile Durkheim, a society is an entity in itself and is greater 
than the sum of its parts (Carls 2012). These parts are the institutions, segments and entities of 
a society such as the legal sector, the education sector, the finance sector and business sector. 
Hobbes (1651) further states that the members of the society agree to appoint a ruler for the 
society and that they agree to transfer authority to the ruler to make and enforce laws for the 
benefit of society and its members. This ruler could be an individual or group but Hobbes was 
writing in the period of the English civil war and was mainly referring to a sovereign, i.e. 
monarch. We can think of the ruler as a government in any form.  
Hobbes (1651) states that when this transfer of authority or power takes place the society and 
its ruler enter into a social contract. The contract means that the ruler is obliged to make and 
enforce laws for the society and that society will obey these laws or suffer a penalty. 
The idea of the social contract was not an original idea of Hobbes. The Greek philosopher 
Plato wrote that Socrates allowed himself to suffer capital punishment rather than attempt to 
escape from prison. Socrates’ reason for this was that if he escaped from prison he would be 
breaking the social contract between himself and the governors of Athens (Plato n.d.). 
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Such a social contract still exists today (Friend 2004). The government today can pass laws 
that must be obeyed. In relation to accounting in Australian today, the government, through 
the Companies Act 2001, requires entities reporting to the society as a whole to prepare their 
financial reports in accordance with the accounting standards and in the language of 
accounting. 
2.5 Summary 
When we consider the area of accounting history we can see that there are numerous sources 
relating to the history of accounting especially in the nineteenth century, which is the time 
relating to this thesis.  
Specifically, the Double Account System is well described by Edwards (1985), Edwards 
(1986), Dicksee (1976) and Parker (1990). All of these writers describe the system, or parts of 
it, and point out the shortcomings. These are mainly that the system used cash rather than 
accrual accounting, usually did not incorporate depreciation and were not audited. 
The concept of capital maintenance is discussed by Edwards (1986), Arden and Aiken (2005), 
Dicksee (1976) and Parker (1990). This is relevant to this thesis because if the profits of the 
railways were overstated there existed the real possibility of distributions of dividends that 
would erode the companies’ capital. 
The picture painted by these authors is that the Double Account System was designed to do 
certain things only, viz. account for stewardship as required by the government and report to 
shareholders in relation to distributable profits. This thesis will consider whether these aims 
are sufficient for an accounting system. 
The strongest impression that we receive from these authors is that the accounting system 
used by the railway companies was limited in its aims and only met those aims to a bare 
minimum. 
In relation to the accounting theories, the three theories, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder 
Theory and Institutional Theory, were selected because they are systems oriented theories. 
That is, they are concerned with more than mandatory reporting.  
A common thread running through the literature on these three theories is the idea of an entity 
seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the society in which it operates. The three theories look at 
legitimacy from different angles but all state that an organisation must have legitimacy to 
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survive. The thesis will look at whether the railway companies under review sought to create 
or maintain legitimacy. 
When considering the social aspect of accounting the literature falls largely into the categories 
of Sociology, Accounting History and Philosophy. 
We see that societies have long been considered to have a social contract between the 
members of the society and its ruler (Plato n.d., Hobbes 1651, Friend 2004).  
We also see that accounting, before the Industrial Revolution, was mainly used by merchants 
for their own information. When the Industrial Revolution came and larger businesses began 
to emerge, such as manufacturers, Canal Companies and Railway Companies, accounting 
needed to change. Its audience was not just the owners of the enterprises by the shareholders, 
members of the society. The financial reports, therefore, were required to report to people 
who had no other contact with the owners or managers. This, combined with the fact that the 
companies were using the public’s money, meant that governments laid down laws requiring 
that the financial reports be of a certain standard and reveal specific information. Accounting 
had, thus, become more than a measuring tool; it was also a social instrument. 
What was not found in the literature that was examined in the preparation of this thesis was 
any author who had used modern accounting theories as a lens through which to examine the 
history of the nineteenth century British railways. It is part of the aim of this thesis to fill that 
gap. 
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Chapter 3: Accounting as a Social Instrument 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that accounting is more than just a measuring tool. 
The chapter aims to show that accounting has become a social instrument. That is, it is an 
instrument used by society to achieve a certain outcome. 
This idea is important in the context of this thesis. If accounting is seen as merely a 
measuring tool then the sole aim of any accounting report would be to disclose the 
measurement of certain aspects of a business. It may show the amount of revenue, 
expenses or assets but that would be all. If this is the case then the aim of any accounting 
system used in any period of history would be the same, i.e. to measure certain things and 
report the results. 
This chapter argues that accounting may have begun as only a measuring tool but, over time, 
has developed into something more. It has developed into a social tool that enables business 
entities to communicate with each other, with themselves and with the wider community. 
We should note here that the accounting under discussion in this chapter, indeed, in this 
thesis, is financial accounting. This thesis is not concerned with management accounting. 
Management accounting is a system by which a business reports to the management of that 
business. It is not concerned with reporting to outside entities and there is no standard way 
of presenting the reports prepared under this type of accounting. What this thesis is 
concerned with is financial accounting. That is, the reporting of an entity to external entities 
such as other businesses, government agencies and society at large. 
3.2 Before the Industrial Revolution 
The first known book explaining accounting was published in Venice in 1494. It was written 
by a monk who was also a mathematician, Luca Pacioli. His book, ‘Everything about 
Arithmetic, Geometry and Proportions’ was actually a five part work on mathematics. But 
one of those parts was about accounting as it was practiced in his day by Venetian 
merchants (Smith 2011). Pacioli did not invent accounting but he is the earliest known 
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person to write about it. It is interesting that he, a mathematician, would include a chapter 
on accounting in a mathematics book. This indicates that, at least to him, and his perceived 
audience, accounting was seen as a branch of mathematics. This seems reasonable because 
accounting, in the fifteenth century, was concerned with figures and calculations. 
Pacioli’s book was the standard text for accounting until the sixteenth century (Smith 2011). 
Lee (1975) states that until the coming of the Industrial Revolution accounting was used by 
merchants as a way of keeping records of their inventory and transactions with their debtors 
and creditors. Paragallo (1977), in discussing the ledger of Jachomo Badoer, demonstrates 
that the ledger keeps track of the items referred to by Lee (1975) above and does so in a 
simple but effective manner. Paragallo (1977) is able to follow the transactions and conclude 
that the ledger is informative but does not balance, as a modern accountant would expect it 
to do. Nonetheless, it served the purpose for the fifteenth century trader. 
This is not to say that only merchants used accounting. For example, governments of the day 
kept records in their treasuries but this is not of concern in this thesis. This work is 
concerned with the accounting of business enterprises. It is true that the nineteenth century 
railway companies were performing a public service in running the railways. However, as 
stated in Chapters One and Four of this thesis, the British governments of the nineteenth 
century left the running of the railways to the private sector. This chapter, therefore, is 
concerned with the development of accounting in the private sector. 
Before the advent of the Industrial Revolution merchants kept their accounting records for 
themselves. They used accounting to keep records and to ensure that they were selling their 
goods at a profit (Lee 1975). Gross profit was of paramount importance to the merchant (Lee 
1975). Lee goes on to say that the only time the merchants were reporting to others was if 
the business was a partnership.  
Even then, the accounting was basically a mathematical exercise. Any further information 
that may have been sought by a partner could be obtained by questioning those who 
prepared the reports. This idea of obtaining additional information is discussed further in the 
next section of this chapter.  
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In summary, we can say that until the coming of the Industrial Revolution accounting was 
seen as mathematical process used by merchants to keep track of their dealings and ensure 
that they were making a gross profit. It was, in other words, a measuring tool. 
3.3 The Industrial Revolution 
With the arrival of the Industrial Revolution the requirements of accounting changed. Up 
until then the merchants were reporting mainly to themselves or their partners. In any 
event, any additional information could be obtained from the preparer of the reports. But 
with the growth in industry commencing in the early part of the nineteenth century, 
business owners were no longer sole operators or in small partnership. Hendriksen states 
that the coming of the railways in Britain caused great advances in accounting theory 
(Hendriksen 1970). But even prior to the railways there were large manufacturing businesses 
and canal companies. These canal companies, unlike businesses up until the late eighteenth 
century, required large amounts of capital to commence operations (Edwards 1985; Lee 
1975; Pollins 1991; Hendriksen 1970). The managers of these companies were now in the 
position where they were reporting not only to themselves but to the government and to 
shareholders, most of whom would have been unknown to them.  
One of the consequences of this was that the nature of accounting changed. Rather than 
being a way of keeping track of inventory, debtors and creditors and noting if a gross profit 
was being made, business operators now were required to report to numerous individuals. 
These individuals were in a position like that of a modern shareholder; they were relying on 
financial statements to obtain financial information about the company in which they had 
invested. That is, the canal and railway companies were what a modern accountant would 
call reporting entities. 
According to SAC 1 the determining factor that decides whether an entity is a reporting 
entity is the availability of information in addition to the basic accounting statements. If the 
information can be easily obtained from the business owners/managers then the entity is 
not a reporting entity and therefore does not have to comply with the accounting standards. 
Indeed, according to the Corporations Act 2001, if a company is a non-reporting entity it 
does not usually have to prepare accounting reports at all. Reporting entities, however, 
whether companies or not, must prepare reports in according to the accounting standards. 
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This is an important and interesting concept. By having the Corporations Act 2001 refer to 
the accounting standards, the law is requiring entities to publish accounts in a standard 
format unless information is available directly from the business owners. It is the flow of 
information that is the deciding factor. The published accounts must contain accounting 
information but also must contain ‘Notes to and Forming Part of the Accounts’ which help 
explain the contents of the reports and also provide non-financial information (AASB 101). 
This is the Government, and therefore society, requiring information in addition to the basic 
accounting reports to be published if it cannot be readily obtained from the preparers of the 
reports.  
3.4 Social Aspects of Accounting 
We can see from the above that the Industrial Revolution caused not only great changes in 
business but great changes in accounting (Lee 1975; Hendriksen 1970). Unlike the pre-
industrial merchants business were now using capital gathered from numerous 
shareholders. That is, they were using the public’s money. They therefore were accountable 
to that public. It reasonable to say the ‘public’, not just the shareholders; any member of the 
public could become a shareholder if they could afford to do so. So the businesses were 
reporting to shareholders and potential shareholders. 
This brings to mind the concept that business entities operate in a social environment, not in 
isolation. The accounting theories examined in Chapter Five of this thesis are described as 
systems oriented accounting theories (Gray, Owen and Adams 1996). They are concerned 
with non-mandatory reporting and are based on the assumption that organisations operate 
in and report to a society (Deegan 2006).  
Field (2010) and Festenstein (2005) state that Dewey (1859-1952) argued that for a 
democratic society to function there has to be communication between elements of that 
society. The elements of the society might also be called sectors. Examples of these sectors 
are the Health Sector, the Business Sector, the Law Sector and the Education Sector. 
Communication between these sectors exists via, inter alia, published reports, speeches, and 
press releases. With the Business Sector, businesses communicate with each other and 
society via the methods mentioned above. Their published reports are their financial 
accounting reports. 
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According to Hobbes (1651) societies abhor a completely natural state of existence. By this 
he means the state of existence that would exist if people were left to themselves with no 
law and order. Hobbes states that this condition can result in a violent death for individuals 
and that a violent death is what humans fear above all else. Hobbes then goes on to say that 
the way human societies have resolved this problem is to agree among themselves that a 
ruler will be appointed and that the society will transfer power to that ruler. The ruler will 
create and enforce laws that are designed to be for the benefit of the society. 
In coming to this arrangement, Hobbes states, the society and the ruler are creating a social 
contract. Friend (2004) states that this contract creates moral and/or political obligations on 
the society and the ruler. This idea of a social contract and its resultant obligations, 
described by Friend as ‘nearly as old as philosophy itself’, is mentioned by Plato (n.d.) in the 
dialogue ‘Crito’ which describes a discussion between Socrates and his friend, Crito. 
Socrates, in prison and awaiting the death sentence, tells Crito that he (i.e. Socrates) should 
not attempt to escape from prison but should accept the death penalty because, if he were 
to escape, he would be breaking the social contract between the governors of Athens and 
him. The social contract requires the governors to govern Athens and also requires him, as a 
citizen of Athens, to obey their laws (Plato n.d.). 
Similarly, a law laid down by the Australian Government in the Corporations Act 2001, means 
that businesses, in their communications with society at large, must use the language of 
accounting in the preparation and presentation of financial accounting reports, which, in 
turn, must be in accordance with International Accounting Standards. This is to promote 
consistency, understandability and comparability and, therefore, usefulness (ASB 
Framework). 
3.5 Summary 
From all this we can see that accounting has become something more than a measuring tool. 
Lee (1975) states that before the Industrial Revolution accounting was mainly used by 
merchants to keep track of Inventory, Debtors and Creditors and to record if they were 
generating a Gross Profit. Paragallo (1977) provides evidence of this by examining the 
fifteenth century ledger of Jachomo Badoer, a Venetian trader operating in Constantinople. 
It recorded the details described by Lee (1975) but little else. 
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Hendriksen (1975) states that the Industrial Revolution provided a push to the development 
of accounting theory. This was because the Canal Companies, the Railway Companies and 
other large industrial companies were no longer reporting just to the owners of the 
enterprises. The capital for these businesses came from the society itself in the form of 
shares and debentures issued to the public. The directors were, therefore, reporting to 
shareholders and potential shareholders, i.e., society as a whole. 
This change meant that accounting was being used for an additional purpose. For smaller 
organisations the owners were still reporting to themselves and a few external individuals 
such as lenders and taxation authorities. But larger enterprises, with which this thesis is 
concerned, were reporting to a much wider audience. The format of their reports needed to 
be different. They needed standardisation to make the reports useful to their readers. 
Hobbes (1651) states that society appoints a ruler and transfer power to that ruler. The 
power is the authority to create and enforce laws for the benefit of the society. Further, this 
creates a social contract between the ruler and the society. This contract requires the ruler 
to create and enforce beneficial laws and also requires members of the society to obey 
those laws (Hobbes 1651; Plato n.d.; Friend 2004). 
Under this arrangement the law makers in modern industrial societies require reporting 
entities to prepare and present their financial reports in accordance with accounting 
standards using the language of accounting. 
We can therefore conclude that, over several centuries, accounting has moved from being a 
measuring tool to an instrument used by society to regulate the financial reports that are 
issued to the society. 
How this concept applies to the nineteenth century British railway company reports will be 
discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: The Double Account System 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the Double Account System that evolved in Great Britain during the 
nineteenth century and was used by Railway Companies to produce their Financial 
Statements. 
The chapter will look at the origins of the system which, it can be argued, go back to the canal 
companies that preceded the railway companies (Edwards 1985). Like the railway companies, 
canal companies required a large capital outlay that had to take place before any revenue was 
earned. But the railways had one further problem. According to Hendriksen (1970), for the 
first time accountants had to deal with that situation, i.e. the large capital outlay, and the 
ongoing need for additional capital to maintain and replace the assets built or acquired in the 
early years of the venture. This problem gave rise to the question of having to distinguish 
between capital and revenue and the need to report accurately in relation to the receipts of 
each. Hendriksen states that 
‘Railroads required a much larger investment and considerably longer lived equipment than most of the 
industrial activity of the mid-nineteenth century. Both of these factors led to an increasing importance 
of the distinction between capital and income’ (Hendriksen 1970 p.38). 
We will see that the system was not designed by any one person or group of individuals; 
rather it came about through what can be looked at as a process of evolution. It will be shown 
to have been developed in response to the changing needs of the users of financial reports. 
That is, as the information that needed to be disclosed changed, so the financial reports 
needed to change, just as the characteristics of a population change in response to the changes 
in its environment. The changes in disclosure requirements from the point of view of 
investors and the railway companies’ response to them will be examined. 
 Edwards (1985) explains that the Double Account System was an accounting method used by 
Statutory Companies, that is, companies incorporated by private Acts of Parliament. Private 
Bills, mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, were used in the late eighteenth century to form 
canal companies and the early horse-drawn railways (Lee 1975).  
The reason for the adoption of this accounting system is discussed in section 3.5 of this thesis. 
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In Great Britain legislation was passed in 1868 making The Double Account System 
compulsory for railway companies. This was followed by similar legislation for Gas Works 
(1871) and Electricity Companies (1892).  
Companies with similar spending patterns, that is, a large initial outlay for infrastructure 
followed by current operational expenses, (for example, companies operating docks, mines, 
quarries etc.) also used the system on a voluntary basis. 
Edwards (1985) also points out that the system was not used after World War II because: 
1) When Britain nationalised industries after World War II it was not a requirement that 
those companies use the system ; 
2) The system was no longer being used voluntarily. 
Edwards states that this second point was true to the best of his knowledge but offers no 
evidence for this belief (Edwards 1985). Wells (cited in Edwards 1985) proposed a system of 
accounting for nationalised industries that emphasised 
1) Stewardship 
2) Efficiency and 
3) Financial viability 
This proposal contained the basic features of the Double Account System, the features of 
which will be explained in section 3.4 of this chapter. This is not to say that Wells was 
advocating a return to the Double Account System but that nationalised industries should, in 
their financial reports, emphasise the three points mentioned above. 
4.2 The Canal and Railway Companies 
     4.2.1 The Canal Companies 
Although this thesis is concerned with the British railways of the nineteenth century, it is 
useful to begin with the canal system of transportation. The canals were expanded in response 
to the increased activity in the early nineteenth century as a result of the beginnings of the 
Industrial Revolution (Lee 1975). Their formation was through Private Bills, as was the 
formation of the railway companies. The canals were also one of the first industries to have a 
large capital outlay while the canal was being created, a period during which no revenue was 
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received. Like the railways, they needed large initial capital (Edwards (1985); Lee (1975); 
Hendriksen (1970). They were, therefore, from the practical point of view and from the 
perspective of the accountant, similar in nature. However, two important distinctions are 
evident and are discussed further on in this section of the thesis. 
The London Canal Museum has called British canals the ‘Routes of the Industrial 
Revolution’. 
While the British did not invent canals, this method of transport was used to a great extent by 
them especially as economic output increased in the early part of the Industrial Revolution in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Transportation by road was slow and hard 
going on the unpaved roads. Canals were a logical alternative to horse drawn transportation 
because the barges could be used to carry large amounts of cargo relatively cheaply. 
The age of canal building in Britain began with the construction of the Bridgewater Canal, 
referred to in Chapter One of this thesis. 
An important feature of the construction of a canal is that there is a large capital outlay before 
any revenue can be collected. This initial expenditure (acquiring the land, surveying and 
digging the canal) is clearly of a capital nature. Even in the eighteenth century this was clear 
to the accountants; the expenditure was in line with the idea of fixed capital that Smith had 
described in ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 1776. Smith’s idea on capital, as set out in that work, 
was part of the prevailing thought among the educated for over a century after its publication. 
(See section 3.4) 
Once a canal had been constructed the major capital works were completed. There was little 
in the way of on-going capital maintenance involved in the running of a canal. Canals do not 
wear out. Even if erosion does take place, it usually will not hamper the use of the canal. Any 
repairs that are required can be seen as just that - repairs, not further capital expenditure. 
To a modern accountant, the initial inflow of funds required to construct a canal was clearly 
an inflow of capital. However, Lee (1975), states that, especially before the Industrial 
revolution, ‘apportionment between capital and revenue items was haphazard and defective’ 
(p.9).  He then goes on to say that ‘public utility companies such as canals tended to capitalise 
fixed asset construction costs’ (p. 17).  
Once this inflow has taken place and the capital expenditure has finished, any further inflow 
of funds is clearly revenue (Lee 1975). The nature of the business meant that the further 
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raising of capital was not needed unless the canal needed to be extended. In this case a new 
Private Bill would be introduced to enable more land to be acquired and so on (Edwards 
1985). 
We can see from this that, in the case of canal companies, the distinction between capital and 
revenue was clear. Capital was raised for the construction of the canal; expenditure was made 
accordingly. After this, revenue in the form of tolls was collected and expenses (such as 
wages and maintenance) were met (Lee 1975). It should be noted that the canal companies did 
not own or operate the boats that used the canals. Their revenue came from tolls charged to 
the boat owners. Their operations can be compared to today’s companies that construct 
highways and charge motorists a toll. 
We can therefore say, in summary, that the canal companies faced a situation that had not 
been faced by the earlier merchants of Britain. Whereas a merchant needed little initial capital 
and could increase the size of his business as profits were accumulated, the canal companies 
needed a large initial capital and had to spend it before income could be earned (Lee (1975); 
Hendriksen (1970). They required permission from Parliament, through Private Bills, to 
acquire land and raise capital through shares and debentures (Lee 1975). Once the canal was 
constructed the inflow to the canal company was mainly of revenue. Additional capital was 
only needed if the canal was to be extended (Edwards 1985). This revenue was in the form of 
tolls paid by the owners of barges that used the canals (Canal Museum). How the accounting 
for the canal companies differed from that of the railway companies in examined in the next 
section. 
     4.2.2 The Railway Companies 
When the railways began to emerge in the first two decades of the nineteenth century a 
situation similar to that of the canal companies was evident. A large outlay of capital was 
again needed before any revenue could be collected. However, two important distinctions 
arose with the railways. 
Firstly, a much larger amount of capital was needed. Not only did land have to be acquired 
but tracks laid and rolling stock had to be purchased. Unlike the canal companies, the railway 
companies owned and operated the means of moving cargo and passengers.  Their revenue 
was not in the form of tolls; they charged for the carrying of freight and passengers. (See 
Appendix One) 
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Secondly, as the railway companies owned rolling stock they had assets that wore out, had to 
be maintained and eventually had to be replaced. Further, the track itself also had to be 
replaced from time to time. (We shall see that the railway directors underestimated the life 
span of the tracks, mainly due to the quality of the steel used.) This meant that the railway 
companies would need, from time to time, to spend more capital to replace tracks, carriages 
and locomotives. The problem faced by the companies was the source of that capital; was it to 
come from retained earnings or external sources? If it was to be an external source, was it to 
be through loans or capital? 
Edwards (1985) and Odlyzko (2010) both emphasize the importance of dividends when 
discussing the railways. Indeed, Edwards states that it was not uncommon for most, if not all, 
of a railway’s annual profit to be paid in dividends. This means that when a section of track or 
pieces of rolling stock needed replacing it may have been necessary for the company to raise 
more equity or loans. If equity was raised, the question was whether the funds raised were of 
capital or revenue nature. Further, was the expenditure on replacing track and rolling stock of 
a capital or revenue nature? That is, was it simply repairs or was it additional capital 
expenditure? This was an important question even in the nineteenth century. If capital and 
revenue receipts were not clearly separated and disclosed a dividend could easily be paid out 
of capital, thus reducing the capital of the company. Lee points out that The Great Western 
Railway Act, 1835, required the company to pay dividends only from  
‘clear Profits and to refrain from paying them in excess thereof, or whereby the Capital of the said 
Company shall in any degree be reduced or impaired’ (Lee 1975, p.20). 
Hendriksen (1970) notes that one of the influences on the development of accounting theory 
was the coming of the railways and the associated problem of distinguishing between capital 
and revenue. He then goes on to say that this need to distinguish between capital and revenue 
gave rise to the idea that capital had to be maintained if the company was to continue. This 
created the need for a charge for depreciation or a provision for maintenance. 
4.3 The Need for Reporting on Stewardship 
The main reason that the government in 1868 for making the Double Account System 
compulsory for railway companies appears to be that the system was seen as an effective way 
of accounting for stewardship.  
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The idea of stewardship was clearly in the mind of the legislators. Edwards (1985, p. 22) 
reports that the earliest railway Act (1801) authorized the Surrey Iron Railway to build a line 
from Croydon to Wandsworth and that s.35 of that Act stated that 
‘all money raised by the said Company by virtue of this Act shall be laid out and applied, in the  
first place, in paying and discharging all Costs and Expenses incurred in applying for, obtaining and  
passing this Act, and all other Expenses preparatory or relating thereto; and the Remainder of such 
money shall be applied in or towards purchasing Lands, and making and maintaining the said Railway  
and other Works, and in otherwise carrying this Act into execution and no other use’.  
 
Edwards goes on to say that it became common practice to include this requirement in 
subsequent Private Acts of railway companies.  
The last four words of that section of the Act are of great importance. The legislation left no 
doubt that the directors of the railway companies were restricted in what they could spend the 
company’s capital on. One can argue that this imposed restriction is reasonable. The 
legislation created the companies and gave them powers to, inter alia, acquire land; large 
sums of cash were involved and the government was entitled to demand that the funds raised 
be accounted for as precisely as possible. These were, after all, private-sector companies 
performing duties normally conducted by the public sector. There is a potential political 
danger when a government gives the private sector the ability to raise large sums for major 
public works. 
The Double Account System developed into an ideal system to meet this requirement of the 
legislation, as we will see in the next section. 
4.4 Characteristics of the Double Account System 
Under the Double Account System the Balance Sheet is subdivided into two statements. 
The first is the Capital Account, which discusses 
a) Capital raised via shares and debentures 
b) Expenditure on Non-Current (Fixed) Assets acquired with the capital to run the 
enterprise 
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The second statement is the General Balance Sheet, which discloses the floating assets and 
liabilities that change as a result of the operations. The format of these statements is as 
follows: 
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT   __DEBIT  CREDIT 
 
Received from: 
    Shares        xxxxx 
     Debentures        xxxxx 
 
Paid to: 
     Non-Current Assets    xxxxx 
     Balance carried forward to the General  
     Balance Sheet     xxxxx 
 
GENERAL BALANCE SHEET  ____DEBIT  ___CREDIT 
Balance brought forward from Capital Account           xxxxx 
Balance from Revenue Account             xxxxx 
Creditors                xxxxx 
Inventory      xxxxx 
Debtors      xxxxx 
Bank       xxxxx 
(See Appendix One) 
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The first statement is called the ‘Capital Account’ but it includes Debentures; it is therefore 
not confined to what we call capital today. It is more like a statement showing what has been 
spent on capital items and how this capital expenditure has been financed (either by capital or 
debt). 
The General Balance Sheet lists all the remaining assets and includes among the equities the 
balance of the Capital Account and the Operating Surplus. 
By keeping the balance of the Capital Account as a separate item it is showing the balance of 
the capital available to be spent; a separation of funds for capital (the Capital Account) from 
the funds for operations (balance of the Revenue Account). 
This fits in well with the idea put forward by Adam Smith in 1776 in his ‘Wealth of Nations’ 
where he proposed that capital actually comes in two types: Fixed Capital and Circulating 
Capital. 
In Book II of that work, entitled ‘Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock’, 
Smith distinguishes between Fixed and Circulating capital. In chapter 1 of that book he states 
that capital 
‘…may be employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again with  
a profit. The capital employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it  
either remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape. The goods of the merchant yield  
him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields him as little till it is again  
exchanged for goods. His capital is continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him  
in another, and it is only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges, that it can yield him  
any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating capitals.’ (p.245) 
 
Smith then states that capital 
‘…may be employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments  
of trade, or in suchlike things as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters, or circulating any  
further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals.’ (p.246) 
 
This distinction between two types of capital was part of the prevailing thought in economics 
for more than a century after the publication of ‘The Wealth of Nations’. After reading 
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Smith’s definitions of ‘capitals’, we can see that the Double Account System fits in neatly 
with the prevailing thought on the subject. The Capital Account reports on the fixed capital 
while the General Balance Sheet is concerned with the circulating capital. 
4.5 Why Have the Double Account System? 
Edwards (1985) describes the Double Account System as an attempt to overcome the 
accounting problems encountered by new forms of economic activity and the companies 
involved in these activities, e.g. railways, where there was a large outlay that needed to be 
completed before operations began. The operations could not expand from a small beginning 
using retained profits to finance expansion. 
He believes that the main accounting problems in this type of company are: 
1) Distinguishing between Capital and Revenue expenditure 
2) The valuation of Non-Current Assets 
3) The calculation of periodic profit 
4) The form and content of Financial Statements for external readers (Edwards 1985 
p.20). 
This idea is supported by Hendriksen (1970) but, as indicated earlier, it is the argument of this 
thesis that the Double Account System, rather than being just concerned with the four 
problems referred to above, was developed also in response to two other needs: 
1) The railway directors were required by legislation to account for their stewardship of 
the capital raised. This is clear from the wording of s.35 of the earliest railway act 
quoted in section 3.3 of this chapter. 
2) The directors were also obliged to report to their shareholders about the periodic profit 
and thus the cash dividends that would be available. Their attempts to keep the 
dividends as high as possible can be seen from the statement by Edwards that it was 
not uncommon for the entire annual profit of a railway company to be paid out as 
dividends. (Edwards 1985 p29) 
Capital expenditure, in this accounting system, seems to have been treated as a once-only type 
of expenditure and left at that. Once the investment is made there is no spreading of costs over 
more than one reporting period with accounting techniques such as depreciation (Lee 1975; 
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Edwards 1985). This was certainly the case in the early years of the railway companies but we 
will see that at some stages a type of depreciation was used. Capital expenditure was treated 
like a series of Sunk Costs with no provision for replacement; fixed assets were retained in the 
accounts at historic cost until disposal (Lee 1975).  
Edwards (1985) points out that both capital and revenue (on-going, day-to-day operations) 
items were accounted for mainly on a cash basis. However, Creditors and Debtors were 
included in later General Balance Sheets (see Appendix One). So it appears that the directors 
were making some allowance for short-term debts due to, and due by, the companies. Just 
how accurate and complete this allowance was may be hard to judge, which is probably why 
Edwards describes the reports as being prepared ‘mainly on a cash basis’. 
The Capital Account seems to be an attempt to be accountable to the shareholders and 
debenture holders. As stated earlier, there was a requirement in the legislation forming these 
companies that the capital raised be used to, inter alia, ‘making and maintaining the said 
railway’ and ‘no other use’.  It also fits in well with Smith’s idea of fixed capital. 
The General Balance Sheet then discloses the balance of unspent capital, the balance of 
unspent accumulated earnings and the remaining assets and liabilities of the enterprise. This 
also fits in well with Smith’s idea of circulating capital. 
4.6 Did the Double Account System Achieve its Aims? 
As stated in section 4.5 above, Edwards (2005) says that the coming of the railways produced 
four problems for accountants: 
1) Distinguishing between Capital and Revenue expenditure 
2) The valuation of Non-Current Assets 
3) The calculation of periodic profit 
4) The form and content of Financial Statements for external readers 
This thesis agrees with these points but also suggests two other aims of the Double Account 
System, viz. the need to comply with s.35 of the legislation creating the railway companies 
(see 4.3 above) and the need to account to the shareholders in relation to the profit available 
for distribution. 
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An example of a financial statement prepared in accordance with the Double Account System 
is shown in Appendix One. 
A perusal of the statements reveals the following points: 
1. The report contains a Capital Account, Revenue Account, Reserve Account and 
Balance Sheet. 
2. The Capital Account discloses the amounts raised for capital works. According to the 
legislation of the day this was necessary as the company had to demonstrate that the 
money raised was used to set up the railway and ‘no other use’. (See section 4.3 
above) The amounts raised and the sources of those funds therefore had to be shown 
as a separate item. 
3. The Capital Account, again to comply with the legislation, then discloses the uses to 
which the funds have been put. The expenditure is classified as ‘Stock’ (expenditure 
on non-current assets); ‘Charges’ (including other expenses incurred in passing and 
complying with the Act) and ‘Debenture Charges’ and ‘Interest’.  
4. The Revenue Account shows receipts from passengers etc. and interest earned as well 
as expenditure on running costs such as maintenance, coal, salaries, and depreciation 
of stock. 
5. The Reserve Account shows the accumulated allowances for depreciation. 
6. The Balance Sheet discloses the balance of the above accounts and sundry accounts 
payable and receivable and “Loan Creditors’ Account”. 
 
Problem 1: Distinguishing between Capital and Revenue Expenditure 
The report shown in Appendix One does show a separation of Capital and Revenue 
expenditure. The expenditure incurred in applying for and the passing of the Private Act 
establishing the company is clearly disclosed, as is expenditure on land acquisition, laying of 
track, constructing stations etc. are also shown. The report therefore can be said to 
demonstrate that the company is complying with the legislation. 
To a twenty-first century accountant it may seem strange that a report would include shares 
and debentures (and costs on debentures) as capital items. Today, debentures would be 
included as liabilities and the costs would be disclosed as finance costs. It is also important to 
note that, according to Edwards (1985), the Capital Account item labelled ‘Interest on Loans 
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previously to General Opening on 17 Sept.’ is, in fact, dividends paid prior to the 
commencement of operations. 
Edwards explains that it was common practice among railway companies of the day to pay 
dividends to shareholders ‘…during the building phase’. Such payments were called interest. 
Edwards then goes on to say that the directors’ ‘justification for this treatment was that 
finance costs would have been part of the price charged if the work had been contracted out’ 
(Edwards 1985, p.34). 
We can see from this logic that the directors believed that they were complying with the Act 
by spending the capital raised only on the matters laid out in the Act. It is not a part of this 
thesis to comment directly on the classifications used by the railway companies; rather, this 
example shows that, despite modern opinion on this treatment, the directors can be said to be 
using the Double Account System to comply with the act and so deal with the first problem 
laid down by Edwards. 
Problem 2: The Valuation of Non-Current Assets 
As for the valuation of Non-Current Assets, we can see in the financial statements shown in 
Appendix One of this thesis that the assets are disclosed at historic cost. Both Pollins (1991) 
and Lee (1975) state that fixed assets were recorded in the accounts at historic cost and 
remained at that value until disposal. It may be argued that there should have been a deduction 
for accumulated depreciation. In fact, there is: it is disclosed in the Reserve Account. Today 
such an amount would be deducted from the historic cost of the assets but this is not an 
attempt to show the valuation of the assets. In modern accounting the depreciation charge is 
an allocation exercise, not a valuation exercise. We can therefore say that the Double 
Account System discloses the value of the assets at historic cost. 
Problem 3: The Calculation of Periodic Profit 
The calculation of periodic profit in the financial statements of these railway companies is an 
area that would cause some concern for the modern reader. The Revenue Account shown in 
Appendix One does not actually show the periodic profit. That is, the profit for the six months 
to 31 December 1838.  It does show the opening balance as at 30 June that year, the revenue 
and expenses since and the balance as at the end of the six months. We could argue that the 
periodic profit is not disclosed but this can be calculated as £86,605 by comparing the 
opening and closing balances. However, this assumes that the directors wanted to disclose the 
periodic profit. From the way the Revenue Account is presented, it can be argued that what 
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the company intended to disclose is the profit available for distribution. It is as though a 
modern accountant posted all revenue and expenses directly to a company’s Retained 
Earnings Account. It would not directly show the periodic profit but would disclose the 
profits available for distribution. This makes sense when we consider Edwards’ statement that 
it was common for the entire profits to be distributed as dividends (Edwards 1985). What the 
directors are showing in their use of the Double Account System is the total that could be 
distributed. 
Problem 4: The Form and Content of Financial Statements for External Readers 
The final problem mentioned by Edwards (1985) is in relation to the form and content of the 
reports for external readers. To comment on the Double Account System’s success or 
otherwise we must first consider the question of whom the ‘external readers’ were.  In other 
words, to whom were the directors reporting? 
Firstly, the railway companies were obliged to show that they had complied with the 
requirements of the Private Acts that were used to create them (see section 3.3 above). The 
companies were, therefore, firstly reporting to the Parliament and used the Capital Account to 
do so. Dicksee states that the Capital Account enabled 
“even those who are unacquainted with scientific bookkeeping to readily discern to what extent monies 
received from shareholders and debenture holders have been applied in the acquisition of fixed assets, and 
this would appear to be the principal, if not the sole, reason for employing this particular form of account” 
(Dicksee, 1903, p.126, quoted in Edwards 1985, p. 23). 
Second, the companies were also reporting to the shareholders in relation to the profits of the 
enterprise and the amounts available for dividends. This information is arguably well 
disclosed in the Revenue Account when we think of the report in its historical context. As 
discussed above, the calculation of the profit would be of concern for a modern reader but this 
is to miss the point. At the time the reports were prepared the accounting standards of today 
had not been written. If the preparers of these reports had in mind a definition of ‘profit’, that 
definition was clearly different from the modern notion. Lee (1975) states that The Great 
Western Railway Act, 1835, required dividends to be paid from ‘clear Profits’ (p.20). 
However, there is nothing as to the calculation of clear profits. Pollins (1991) states that ‘clear 
profit’ is mentioned in various Tramway Acts when discussing dividends but that ‘clear profit 
was not defined’ in the Leicester Tramway Act, 1877 or the Tramways Orders Confirmation 
[No. 2] Act, 1884 (p. 284). 
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Additional Problems 
This thesis adds two other points of importance to those stated by Edwards (1985) and 
Hendriksen (1970). Those points, as stated earlier, are that the railway companies were 
obliged by legislation to report to Parliament on their stewardship in relation to capital raised 
and that they had to report to shareholders about distributable profit. 
The discussion above in relation to Problem 1 states that the reports of the railway companies, 
as shown in appendix One, satisfy the requirements of the legislation by showing clearly in 
the Capital Account the amounts raised as capital via shares and debentures and the use to 
which that cash had been put. While a modern accountant may not agree with the 
classifications used in the report, the overall aim of reporting on stewardship has been met. 
As for reporting to shareholders in relation to distributable profit, the discussion under 
Problem 3 and Problem 4 indicate that the directors were reporting the profit available for 
distribution. Indeed, the report, as seen in Appendix One, does not actually state the periodic 
profit but, rather, shows the accumulated profit. That is, it shows the total of the undistributed 
profits available as dividends. It is rather like the modern Retained Earnings Account in that 
sense but, unlike the modern account, the Revenue and Expenses are posted directly to it and 
not to a Profit and Loss Account. In this sense it can be seen that the main concern of the 
directors was to show the total available profits with less emphasis on the periodic profits that 
gave rise to the balance. This emphasis is at odds with modern practice but does fit in with the 
idea of this thesis that the companies were trying to report to the shareholders in relation to 
the profits available for distribution. Thus the Double Account System achieved its aim in this 
matter. 
Further to this, Lee (1975) states that The Great Western Railway Act 1835 was specific 
about the financial reports and to whom they should be addressed. That Act required the 
preparation of half-yearly accounts that had to be presented at half yearly general meetings of 
shareholders. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the Double Account System, looking at the origin of the system and 
how it operated. 
Edwards (1985) gives a detailed history of the system and concludes that no particular person 
or organisation devised the system. Rather, he states that the system originated in the early 
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canal companies and further evolved in response to the needs of the users of the railway 
companies’ financial reports. 
Legislation forming the railway companies required the directors to spend capital raised on 
costs of forming the company, purchasing land, setting up the actual railway and purchasing 
non-current assets. The accounting reports therefore had to show that this had happened; that 
the capital had been used for no other purpose.  
In order to achieve this, the financial reports contained: a Capital Account showing the capital 
raised and the expenditure of that money and a Revenue Account that showed the revenue and 
expenditure of the company. This differs from a modern income statement mainly in that it 
was not closed periodically but stayed open rather like a modern Retained Earnings Account 
(see Appendix One). It can therefore be said to show the reader the amount of earnings 
available for distribution as dividends. 
Whether the amount so calculated is in line with the amount that would be calculated in a 
modern report is questionable but beyond the concern of this study. 
The Reserve Account disclosed the amount allowed for in relation to the depreciation of the 
non-current assets. According to Edwards (1986) this allowance was not always disclosed and 
was sometimes revered during times of lower than expected profit. Edwards further indicates 
that the purpose of the Reserve Account was to make provision for the replacement of the 
assets rather than spread the costs over the assets’ useful lives (Edwards 1986). This may be at 
odds with modern thinking on depreciation but at the time of the Double Account System the 
provision was seen as a reserve for future use. 
Edwards (1985) raises four problems that arose as a result of the coming of the railways. 
Hendriksen (1970) agrees with Edwards and argues that the advent of railways encouraged 
the advancement of accounting theory.  
When we consider the discussion in this chapter we can say the following about the Double 
Account System: 
 The use of the Capital Account separated the capital raised and disclosed the 
expenditure of those funds, thus solving the Capital versus Revenue question and 
enabled the companies to comply with the legislation. 
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 Non-Current Assets were disclosed in historical cost but did not have the accumulated 
depreciation deducted from the gross; rather the depreciation was shown in the 
Reserve Account. 
 The profit was shown but its calculation would be questioned by a modern reader. 
Also the amount of periodic profit was not shown as a separate item; rather, the 
amount of total available profit was shown as being available for dividends. 
We can therefore say that the Double Account System evolved in response to the needs that 
the directors believed needed to be met (i.e. accounting for stewardship and calculation of 
distributable profits). Whether the directors could or should have seen other needs will be 
discussed in further chapters of this work. 
51 
 
Chapter 5 – Systems Oriented Accounting Theories 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the three accounting theories mentioned in Chapter One (Legitimacy 
Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory) and relates them to the railway 
companies of the nineteenth century. 
 
This chapter describes what is meant by ‘Systems Oriented Theories’; how these theories are 
concerned with, firstly, non-mandatory reporting and secondly, how these theories are 
concerned with the interaction between reporting entities and their environment, that is, the 
society in which they operate. 
 
This will involve a discussion of the contents of the three theories and how they overlap to 
form one idea that accounting is more than a recording and measuring instrument; it is a 
social instrument that is the language in which the reporting entities communicate with 
interested parties in the society. 
The reasons for selecting these theories are provided in section 1.3.2 of this thesis. 
 
5.2 Why ‘Systems Oriented’? 
 
When we talk of ‘Systems Oriented Theories’ the first question that comes to mind is the 
meaning, in this context, of ‘systems’. In other words, why are we calling these, or any, 
theories, ‘systems oriented’? 
 
Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) discuss the concept of a system. They describe a system as 
being a set of connected things or parts of an organized body. 
 
We can use the word ‘system’ in describing an entire functioning entity or a part of that 
entity, such a part being a system in itself. For example, a living body, say a human, can be 
looked on as a system of living organs functioning together (a set of connected parts). Within 
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that entity there are other sub systems. We have a Circulatory System that directs the blood 
around our body; a Respiratory System that transfers oxygen into the blood stream and carbon 
dioxide out; a Digestive System that transfers nutrients out of the food we eat into the blood 
stream; a Urinary System that filters waste out of the blood and expels it from the body and so 
on. Each of these sub-systems is a functioning collection of organs within itself and the body 
can be seen as a collection of these sub-systems that, working together, make up the living 
body. The Digestive System extracts the nutrients necessary to keep the body functioning, the 
Circulatory System transports those nutrients and the Urinary System cleans out the other 
systems, thus allowing them to function, and at the same time receives its nutrients from 
them. The sub-systems within the human body are connected either by a transfer of materials 
(oxygen moves to cells in all the sub-systems via the Circulatory System) or a dependency on 
each other (the Urinary System can only function if the other systems are functioning and the 
others such as the Circulatory System will cease to function if the Urinary System stops 
operating). 
 
In a similar way we can look on society as a set of connected parts, a complex whole that is 
made up of various sub-systems. These include an Education System, Defence System, Law 
and Order System and so on. Each of these is an organized body, as mentioned in the 
definition above and they also fit together to make a society. So, as in the analogy with the 
human body, we can see a society as a functioning entity with sub-systems that operate within 
themselves and operate together to keep the whole society functioning.  
 
One of the systems within a modern, industrial society is a Business System or Business 
Sector. Within this sector we have the entities that conduct business and the entities that 
oversee the conducting of that business. It may be argued that these latter entities are actually 
part of the Law and Order System but in any event there are entities that administer the laws 
and rules laid down by the society’s governing bodies to regulate the entities within the 
business system. 
 
The Business Sector, like other sub-systems within a living body or a society, does not 
operate in isolation. It has some functions that begin and end internally but there is also 
contact with other systems within society. Because society and its sub-systems are made up of 
humans we can call this contact ‘communication’. That is, the sub-systems, and the entities 
within those sub-systems, communicate with each other and with the society as a whole. This 
communication requires some sort of medium through which the communication flows. It 
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also requires a language. In the case of communication by the business sector the medium is a 
financial report and the language used is ‘accounting’. 
 
So when we talk about ‘accounting’ we are really talking about the language of business. 
Businesses use this language to communicate with each other and society through various 
reports. Reports can be oral but usually are written and in business the written report is the 
financial report, the notes that form part of the report and the other reports (Directors’ Report, 
Auditor’s Report and so on) that go to make up the company’s report. 
 
Other reports exist, such as speeches and press releases but in this thesis we are concerned 
with accounting and the annual reports of entities. 
 
Much of the content in the annual report is mandatory. If we are talking about mandatory 
reporting we are talking about (mainly) entities covered by Part 2M.3, Div. 1 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. These are Disclosing Entities, Public Companies, large Proprietary 
Companies and Registered Schemes. 
 
However, some reporting, even by these entities, is voluntary. This thesis is mainly concerned 
with voluntary reporting. 
 
     5.2.1 Systems Thinking and General Systems Theory 
 
Thinking of systems the way described above is referred to as ‘Systems Thinking’. The theory 
built around this thinking is referred to ‘General Systems Theory’.  
 
Systems Thinking is attributed to Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901 – 1972) an Austrian-born 
biologist. Von Bertalanffy was, according to Gray, Owen & Adams (1996), concerned with 
the tendency of scientists to think in terms of reductionism. That is, looking at systems in 
isolation. Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) go on to say that von Bertalanffy believed that part 
of an overall system can be only understood if it is viewed in context.  
 
According to Von Bertalanffy, 
 
‘systems of various order [are] not understandable by investigation of their respective parts in isolation. 
Conceptions and problems of this nature have appeared in all branches of science, irrespective of 
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whether inanimate things, living organisms, or social phenomena are the object of study’ (Von 
Bertalanffy 1968). 
 
Von Bertalanffy (1950) also discussed “open” and “closed” systems. He differentiated 
between them by saying that a system is ‘closed’ if ‘no material enters or leaves it; it is open 
if there is import and export and, therefore, change of the components’. He then goes on to 
say that open systems maintain themselves by exchanging materials with the environment (p. 
23). 
 
     5.2.2 Relevance to Accounting Theories 
 
Gray, Owens & Adams (1996) state that General Systems Theory ‘is especially helpful as a 
way of thinking – as a mental framework with which to stand back from issues and see them 
in their broader context’ (p.13). 
 
With this in mind, coupled with Von Bertalanffy’s idea above, we can see why the accounting 
theories discussed in this work are called ‘Systems Oriented Theories’ and why they are 
helpful in developing this thesis. 
 
The reasons can be stated as follows: 
 
1. The theories are not connected with mandatory reporting. 
2. They are concerned with voluntary reporting, especially by entities to which Part 2M.3 
of the Corporations Act 2001 apply. 
3. They are concerned with systems because: 
 They treat business entities as components of the business sub-system/sector 
 They look at how these entities communicate with each other and their 
environment 
 The imports and exports to and from these entities, as described by Bertalanffy, are 
the flows of information  between the entities and other businesses and society 
generally 
 The information is in the nature of reports from the entities (exports) and reactions 
and responses to those reports (imports) 
4.  The theories are therefore related to systems and systems thinking 
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5. They are relevant to this thesis because when we view the historic events through the 
lens of these theories we are standing ‘back from issues’ and looking at them in ‘their 
broader context’ as mentioned by Gray Owens & Adams (1996).  
 
Deegan (2006) states that ‘theories are abstractions of reality and hence particular theories 
cannot be expected to provide a full account or description of particular behaviour’. 
 
It follows from this that if one is going to view historical events from an accounting theory 
perspective it is advisable to refer to more than one theory, as long as the theories are 
consistent. 
 
The three theories mentioned above are relevant to this thesis because they are examples of 
what have been described as ‘systems-oriented theories’ (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996, p.45). 
They therefore allow us to have what Deegan calls ‘a systems-oriented view’ of the events 
(Deegan 2006). 
 
Systems-oriented accounting theories are concerned with management’s decisions to report 
beyond what is mandatory (Deegan 2006; Gray, Owen and Adams 1996). This thesis 
examines whether the railway companies of the nineteenth century confined their reporting to 
the statutory minimum or went beyond what was required. If we can conclude that the 
companies did not exceed their mandatory reporting requirements we should consider, firstly, 
why this happened and, secondly, what this indicates about the management of these entities. 
That is, were they being run solely as money-making vehicles or as social entities? 
 
5.3 Accounting Theories 
 
     5.3.1 Legitimacy Theory 
      
‘Legitimacy Theory asserts that organisations continually seek to ensure that they are 
perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies’. (Deegan 
2006) That is, they are trying to ensure that their activities are perceived as being legitimate. 
 
Tilling (2004) breaks Legitimacy Theory down into two layers: Institutional Level and 
Organisational Level. 
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The Institutional Level of the theory is concerned with how the entity gains legitimacy by its 
dealings with organisations in society as a whole. As an entity interacts with other entities 
within its society it conforms to certain norms that are established by the society and with 
which the other organisations already conform. If the newer entity is to continue with this 
interaction, that is, survive, it must conform to the expectations of the society by fitting in 
with the already established “legitimate” entities.  
 
Taking this idea a step further we can see that society influences and moulds the behaviour of 
the newer entity through the interaction between it and the established entities which, 
themselves, have gone through the process of creating their own legitimacy just as the newer 
entity is doing.  This influence is not direct but society does indirectly influence the newer 
entities by granting them legitimacy if they are perceived as conforming to the standards and 
norms already being followed by the existing organisations. Put simply, a new entity 
interacting with an established entity will, in fact, be following society’s expectations merely 
by fitting in with the established norm. In this way society moulds the entity through its 
interactions with legitimate organisations. 
 
Tillings’ second level of Legitimacy Theory, the Organisational Level, looks at how an 
entity’s management establishes, maintains, extends and defends its legitimacy. 
Cowan and Deegan (2011) examined changes in corporate emissions disclosure practices 
during the implementation of the National Pollutant Inventory. They found that environmental 
regulation may act to drive voluntary disclosure, although the resultant disclosures were 
‘questionable’.  They concluded, inter alia, that ‘disclosing companies also appear to have 
provided NPI and emission disclosures as a purely reactive (legitimising) exercise’ (p.431). 
Carpenter and Feroz (1992) also discuss a modern attempt to regain legitimacy. In their 
examination of the decision by the State of New York to adopt Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) they argue that ‘the state’s decision to adopt GAAP was an 
attempt to regain legitimacy for the state’s financial management practices’ (p. 613). 
However, they do go on to say that the state’s decision was actually an example of 
institutional theory at work with pressure being put on the state’s administrators to adopt 
GAAP. They argue that:  
‘The state of New York needed a symbol of legitimacy to demonstrate to the public and the credit 
markets that the state’s finances were well managed. GAAP, as an institutionalized legitimated practice, 
serves this purpose’ (p. 635). 
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The argument of Carpenter and Feroz (1992) is further evidence that legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory overlap.  
 
As we are concerned here with legitimacy in the accounting theory sense we should be clear 
what is meant by legitimacy. 
 
In relation to Legitimacy Theory Lindblom (1993) states that: 
 
‘Legitimacy is a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part’ (Lindblom 1993, p. 51). 
 
Lindblom goes on to say that the concept of Legitimacy does not imply that the judgement of 
society need be consensual or universal. Indeed, a universal consensus may be impossible to 
achieve. Rather, she states that the assessment of legitimacy is done at an individual level and 
that ‘the individuals form various stakeholder relationships with the corporation and may be 
usefully referred to as the relevant publics’ (Lindblom 1993, p.52). 
 
Lindblom further states that these various relevant publics may be in conflict with each other 
in relation to their perception of the legitimacy of the activities of an entity. Indeed, these 
conflicts may reach a point where the relationship between the company and the stakeholders 
can be destroyed (Lindblom 1993). 
 
From this we can see that, according to this theory, business entities seeking legitimacy try to 
act in accordance with principles that are seen as being of a standard type. These standard 
types are determined by the society in which the entity operates so we can say that the 
businesses are attempting to act in accordance with society’s expectations, thus avoiding the 
damage to the relationship referred to above by Lindblom. 
 
Legitimacy can, therefore, been seen as a perception. Businesses create the perception that 
they are acting in accordance with the expectations of society and, thus, with legitimacy. They 
want to be seen to be acting within society’s bounds and norms. 
 
This idea gives rise to two very important points that have to be considered in the context of 
this thesis. 
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The first is that these bounds and norms are not fixed (Deegan 2006). As societies change or 
evolve so, too, do the norms of that society. Deegan goes on to say that because these norms 
change over time as the societies change the managers of the businesses ‘need to be 
responsive to the current ethical environment in which they operate’ (Deegan 2006, p. 275). 
 
Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of an entity will vary over time as the society and its 
values change. This is because legitimacy is created by the society and this creation is based 
on the perception of the entity by society. 
 
Put simply, the activities acceptable in one period may not be acceptable in another. 
 
According to Tilling (2004), Legitimacy Theory is a powerful mechanism for helping us to 
understand voluntary disclosure in annual reports. What this means is that if we are to 
understand why an entity volunteers information in addition to that which it must provide then 
we can look to Legitimacy Theory. Tilling is really saying that entities are seeking legitimacy 
by providing information to such an extent that the users of the reports will look more 
favourably upon the entity and through this favourable perception the business will create or 
gain legitimacy. 
 
This leads us to the second important point. 
 
If something can be created or gained the question that can arise is, ‘What is the nature of this 
thing’? Clearly, in this case the thing created, legitimacy, is an intangible product. It is a 
perception of the society in which the entity operates. But it is also something that the entity 
requires to continue operating in its environment. According to both Deegan (2006) and 
Tilling (2004) this legitimacy is not only desirable but essential to the continuing existence of 
the entity. This idea is also raised by Scott (1987) when he discusses Institutional Theory. He 
argues that an entity, in order to survive, must conform to the rules and belief systems held 
within its environment to earn legitimacy. It is interesting that Scott (1987) brings in the idea 
of legitimacy while discussing Institutional Theory. This is in line with the point made earlier 
that the theories discussed in this thesis overlap and should not considered in isolation. (See 
section 3.2.3 below). 
 
It follows that if legitimacy can be created or gained and is seen as a necessary thing to have 
in an entity it must be a resource.  
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In considering what is or is not a resource Schaper, Volery et al (2010) define a resource as 
‘any thing or quality that is useful’ (p.144). They go on to say that Resource Based Theory 
recognizes six types of resources, viz. Financial, Physical, Human, Technological, Reputation 
and Organisational. Further, they state that ‘Reputation’ is to do with the perceptions that 
people in an entity’s environment have of the entity. This definition of reputation fits clearly 
with the idea of legitimacy as used in Legitimacy Theory. 
 
Wernerfelt (cited in Schaper, Volery et al) describes a resource as ‘anything which could be 
thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm’ and is also ‘those tangible and intangible 
assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm’. 
 
Deegan (2006) and Tilling (2004) both make the point that legitimacy is a resource like any 
other resource. Deegan (2006) argues that entities create this resource and manipulate it 
through the disclosures in its financial reports. 
 
If legitimacy is seen as being necessary for the continued existence of the entity the managers 
will (or at least should) ensure that there is a regular supply of this resource. This notion is 
supported by Deegan (2006) who states that ‘organisations continually seek to ensure that 
they are perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies’. 
The use of the word ‘continually’ implies that it is not enough to create an impression of 
legitimacy; rather, the managers need to gain, maintain and extend, if possible, the legitimacy 
of the entity just as they would any other resource. 
 
The importance of maintaining this resource may seem obvious to a twenty-first century 
reader but we must also remember to put this idea into the context of this thesis. If the railway 
company managers did not believe that legitimacy was vital to the continuation of the 
activities of the entity then they would see no need to ensure its supply. 
 
It is the argument of this thesis that the Double Account System met the requirements 
imposed by legislation and enabled a distributable profit to be calculated. However, there is 
no evidence found in the existing literature that the Double Account System was designed to 
create or promote legitimacy. 
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Indeed, in his major work on the Double Account System Edwards (1985) states that the 
system was not designed or developed by any one person or organisation. Rather, he talks 
about the ‘evolution of the double account system’ implying that the system was developed 
over time to meet the needs of the users of the reports as understood by the directors.  At no 
stage in that work does he state or imply that the development of the system was concerned 
with the creation or maintenance of legitimacy. 
 
A counter argument to this is that in attempting to provide reports that complied with the 
stewardship requirements of the legislation and provided the shareholders with information 
about distributable profit the Double Account System was, de facto, being used to create 
legitimacy in the context of the nineteenth century. 
 
This is an important point. 
 
Previously, in section 1.3.2 above, it was stated that the three theories discussed in this thesis 
relate to reporting that goes beyond mandatory reporting requirements. But what is meant by 
‘beyond mandatory reporting requirements’? Some clarification is needed here. 
 
In the context of this thesis ‘beyond mandatory reporting’ may be interpreted as meaning 
disclosing matters that are in addition to whatever must be disclosed to make the reports 
compliant with the law. 
 
Alternatively, ‘beyond mandatory reporting could mean that the reporting discloses what the 
legislators intended to be disclosed but may do so in a format not as envisaged by those 
legislators. 
 
It is therefore possible to argue that the railway companies were gaining legitimacy by 
reporting what they had to report and were doing so in a way that was acceptable to the users 
of the reports. A review of the extract from s.35 of the Act quoted in section 4.3 of this thesis 
reminds us that the legislation states what must be done, or not done, with the company’s 
capital but says nothing as to how the use of the funds is to be reported. Also, as stated in 
section 4.3 of this thesis, the Government eventually made the Double Account System 
compulsory for all railway companies and this was mainly done because the legislators 
viewed that system as being an effective way of accounting for stewardship. 
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When we consider this we are left with the notion that the railway companies gained 
legitimacy not just by reporting that they had complied with the legislation but by reporting in 
a way that was acceptable to the nineteenth century users of the reports, that is society as a 
whole. 
This leads us to the question of whether complying with mandatory requirements is ever 
enough to gain or keep legitimacy. Lindblom (1993) states that because the laws of a society, 
as created by the government via legislation and interpreted by the courts in their decisions, 
should reflect the attitudes of the society then obeying the laws should produce legitimacy for 
the organisation. She goes on to say that ‘…the law would serve as the source of legitimacy 
because of its correlation with the social values and norms. Functioning legally would serve 
as the indicator of legitimacy’ (Lindblom 1993 p.53). 
 
This seems clear but then Lindblom raises three possible sources of discrepancy between the 
legal environment and legitimacy (Lindblom 1993). 
 
The three possible sources of discrepancy are: 
1. A social norm may have changed but the law may not have been amended to take 
account of that change. (e.g. people may have a low opinion of cigarette production 
but such a business is not illegal) 
2. There may be consistency in the laws but inconsistency in society’s perceptions. 
Lindblom’s example is that a company may operate just above the statutory minimum 
in relation to emission laws but may less highly regarded that a firm that operates just 
below the requirements but is making efforts to improve its performance. 
3. There may be a difference between what a society will tolerate and what it will 
specifically sanction through laws. Lindblom gives the example of the possible trade-
off a community may face if strict application of emissions laws would cause the 
closure of a local business resulting in large numbers of people being laid off.  
 
Lindblom then states that the idea of legitimacy for a business must be considered separately 
from the legal situation and concludes that ‘disclosure limited to legal/regulatory compliance 
would not be sufficient for legitimacy assessment’ (Lindblom 1993 p. 55). 
This is a very important point. What Lindblom is saying in the quote in the paragraph above, 
is that an entity often needs to do more than merely obey the law to gain legitimacy. This 
thesis has argued that the nineteenth century railway companies used the Double Account 
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System to comply with the legislative requirements to report on stewardship (see section 3.3 
of this thesis). Lindblom’s argument above is important in this study because, with this idea in 
mind, we can conclude that if all the railway companies were doing was complying with the 
legislation that alone will not necessarily gain legitimacy for the entities. Lindblom’s point 
therefore adds weight to the argument that the nineteenth century British railways were not 
using the financial statements to seek legitimacy. 
One should also ask whether there is any evidence that British society in the nineteenth 
century expected the railway companies to do any more than just obey the law. 
In answer to this question the following can be considered. 
During the railway mania of the 1840s the British government appointed a committee to 
review the accounting and audit practices of the railway companies. This committee, chaired 
by Lord Monteagle, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the Select Committee of the 
House of Lords on the Audit of Railway Accounts (Parker 1990). This committee is often 
referred to in the literature as “The Monteagle Committee”. Its purpose was to consider 
‘…whether the railway acts do not require amendment, with a view of providing for a more effectual 
audit of accounts, to guard against the application of the funds of such companies to purposes for which 
they were not subscribed under the authority of the legislature’. (Great Britain. Parliament. 1849. p.1) 
The committee was also concerned with the possibility that the companies had paid dividends 
out of capital (Bryer 1991). Bryer then goes on to state that the Monteagle Committee 
reported that ‘…few people take the trouble to inspect Railway statements’ and that those that 
did do so would have had ‘…a belief that the dividends declared come bona fide out of 
profits’ (Monteagle, 1849, p. 215, cited in Bryer 1991). The committee was, therefore, not 
just concerned about whether the railway companies were complying with the law. It was 
concerned with whether the financial reports, even when complying with the law, were 
deceiving the public. 
Further evidence that society wanted the companies to do more than just obey the law can be 
found in the publication, in 1845, of the short story “The Glenmutchkin Railway” by 
Professor W. E. Aytoun. The story, reproduced in its entirety as an appendix in Odlyzko 
(2010), satirizes the formation of a railway, highlighting the recklessness and impracticality of 
the project. Odlyzko states that ‘most of the manoeuvres described in the story…that today 
could place investors and executives in jail (if detected and proved) were not illegal in the 
laissez faire atmosphere of the 1840s’ (Odlyzko 2010 pp192-193). Again, the concern was not 
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raised by any illegal practices by railway directors but by society’s desire for more than 
simply following the rules. 
 
5.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Gray, Owen and Adams state that stakeholder theory is ‘an explicitly systems-based view of 
the organisation and its environment which recognises the dynamic and complex nature of the 
interplay between them’ (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996, p. 45). 
 
Deegan states that there are similarities between Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory 
(Deegan 2006).  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995, p. 52, cited in Deegan, 2006) state that 
‘stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are better seen as two (overlapping) perspectives’. 
Therefore, Deegan argues, to treat them as two totally distinctive theories would be a mistake 
(Deegan, 2006). 
 
The main distinction between Legitimacy and Stakeholder Theories can be seen if we look at 
a broad view of both theories. 
 
In section 5.3.1 of this work we saw that Legitimacy Theory is concerned with the idea that 
organisations are constantly trying to gain and maintain legitimacy by operating within the 
bounds of the expectations of the society in which they operate. It is important to note that 
both Deegan (2006) and Tilling (2004) refer to the entities’ concern with the way society 
perceives them. That is, they (the entities) are concerned with how society as a whole sees 
them. 
 
However, Lindblom (1993) states that in assessing the legitimacy of an entity the stakeholders 
form various relationships with the organisation. Her use of the word stakeholders is 
important. It indicates that legitimacy is formed by the perceptions of groups within the 
society rather than society as a whole. This leads on to a distinguishing feature of 
Stakeholders Theory. Stakeholder Theory is concerned with legitimacy but is more concerned 
with the interaction between the entity and various stakeholders, not society as a whole. 
 
Stakeholder Theory has been described as having two branches. They are the ethical branch 
and the managerial branch (Deegan 2006), also called the normative and the organisation-
centred branches respectively (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996). 
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These two branches can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 
The Ethical Branch refers to the argument that all stakeholders have a right to be treated fairly 
by an organisation (Deegan 2006).  
 
According to Freeman and Reed (1983) the term ‘stakeholder’ has two definitions. First, there 
is the narrow definition which includes groups that are ‘vital to the survival and success of the 
corporation. The wide definition includes any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the corporation’ (cited in Freeman, 1992, p. 42). 
 
When we are considering the Ethical Branch of Stakeholder Theory we are considering the 
wide definition. We are assuming that the entity owes to all stakeholders an equal degree of 
obligation to treat them fairly. There is no differentiation between stakeholders; they are all 
owed fair treatment regardless of the importance they may have to the business. 
 
However, the managerial branch of the theory is concerned with the way organisations treat 
various stakeholders. This branch assumes that an entity will treat a more powerful 
stakeholder differently from the way it treats others. Deegan states that an entity ‘will be 
likely to attend to the expectations of particular (typically powerful) stakeholders’ (Deegan 
2006, p.298). 
 
Gray, Owen and Adams further state that in this branch of the theory  
 
‘…the stakeholders are identified by the organisation of concern (not by society) by reference to the 
extent to which the organisation believes the interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to 
further the interests of the organisation’ (Gray Owen and Adams, 1996 p.46) (their italics).  
 
When we consider all this we can see that the two theories, Legitimacy and Stakeholder do 
have a clear overlap. Both are concerned with gaining and maintaining legitimacy but 
Legitimacy Theory considers the idea more broadly in that it looks at the interaction between 
the entity and society whereas Stakeholder Theory is more concerned with the interaction 
between the entity and stakeholders. 
 
When we try to relate this to the nineteenth century British railways we can take a stage 
further the statement at the end of the section 5.3.1 on Legitimacy Theory. That section 
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concluded by saying that even though there is little in the literature that states that the railway 
managers were trying to create or maintain legitimacy it can be argued that they were, in fact, 
doing this when they developed the Double Account System. It can be argued that they were 
gaining legitimacy by complying with the law and providing the shareholders with 
information that they wanted. That is, the stakeholders with whom the railway directors were 
mainly concerned were the government and the shareholders. The directors can be said to be 
acting in accordance with the managerial branch of Stakeholder Theory. 
 
What is meant here is that we can conclude that Stakeholder Theory does apply to the case of 
the nineteenth century railway companies. 
 
Deegan (2006) has stated that there is an overlap between Legitimacy theory and Stakeholder 
Theory. But this does not mean that if one of these theories applies to a situation the other 
does so automatically. 
 
This thesis has stated that Legitimacy Theory applies to the reporting of the railway directors. 
The thesis states that it applies because the companies were seeking Legitimacy either 
consciously or were, in effect doing so. 
 
If Legitimacy Theory does apply need we even consider Stakeholder theory given that there is 
a connection between the two? The answer is that there is a good argument that the 
managerial branch of Stakeholder Theory applies in this case. That branch refers to an entity’s 
differing treatment of various stakeholders depending on their perceived importance to the 
entity. This is the significance of the quote from Gray Owen and Adams (1996) cited above. It 
can be argued that the railway directors sought legitimacy, deliberately or not, but that it 
seems that they certainly were paying particular attention to two stakeholders, viz. the 
legislators and the shareholders. 
 
If this is the case then Stakeholder Theory can be seen as applicable to this study. 
 
 5.3.3 Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional Theory can be described as an attempt to look at the forms that business entities 
take. By this statement we do not mean the vehicle through which a business operates, such as 
a company, trust or partnership. Rather, it is the form of the business and the rules with which 
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it operates, especially in relation to other entities within its society, which this theory 
examines. 
 
The use of the word Institutional in the title of this theory implies that the theory states that 
businesses lack individuality and become, at least to some extent, uniform. That is, that over 
time the firms become similar to each other.  
 
Scott (1987) argues that organisations must conform to rules and belief systems in order ‘to 
earn legitimacy’. His reference to legitimacy when discussing Institutional Theory does not 
mean that the two theories are the same. It does mean, however, that two theories overlap. 
Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman (2004) discuss ‘social processes through which these [business] 
structures develop’ (p. 508). This indicates a difference between Institutional Theory and 
Legitimacy Theory. While both refer to the creation of legitimacy there is a difference 
emphasis on the way this legitimacy comes about. The use by Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman of 
the term ‘social processes’ indicates that they are talking about society exerting an influence 
on the organisation. Di Maggio and Powell (1983) also discussed this process of changing and 
conforming. They used the term ‘isomorphism’ to describe this process. The term 
‘isomorphism’ comes from the science of biology. In that discipline the word means ‘a 
similarity of appearance displayed by organisms having different genotypes’ (New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary1993). The same dictionary defines a genotype as ‘The genetic 
constitution of an individual…the whole of the genes in an individual or group’. 
 
From this we can see that what Di Maggio and Powell (1983) are saying is that organisations 
may be different in origin, legal structure and purpose but that they will change so as to 
conform to the expectations and rules of their environment. That is, just as two plants may 
appear to be similar (both have similar leaves and flowers, for example) even though they are 
different genetic structure, so, too, two firms may begin as quite different types of entities and 
remain different types of entities but, over time, develop similar characteristics by adopting, 
for example, the same rules and  belief systems. 
 
This idea of the society forming and moulding the entities was taken up by Riaz (2009) in his 
discussion of the Global Financial Crisis. He suggests that the opposite may occur if some 
organisations become powerful enough to influence the institutions with which they operate. 
He calls this process ‘reverse legitimacy’ He then goes on to say that reverse legitimacy is 
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‘the ability of powerful business and financial organisations today to reverse-legitimate 
institutions through their own success’ (Riaz 2009, p. 3). 
Di Maggio and Powell (1983) also refer to an organisational field. By this term the authors 
mean a group of entities that produce similar services or products and share key suppliers, 
resources, consumers and regulatory agencies.  
 
We could refer to this organisational field as an industry such as the mining industry, the 
building industry or, especially in this thesis, the railway industry. 
 
Di Maggio and Powell (1983, p.148) then go on to say that once this organisational field 
becomes established ‘powerful forces emerge that lead them [i.e. the organisations] to become 
more similar to one another’.  
 
What this indicates is that for isomorphism to take place there has to be, first, an 
organisational field (i.e. industry) made up of various entities that may or may not be directly 
dealing with each other. Because these entities are in competition with each other it is more 
likely that there is no series of direct transactions between the entities in the field. This seems 
at odds with the Institutional Level of Legitimacy Theory described by Tilling (2004) which 
refers to an entity gaining legitimacy by dealing with other organisations. But there is no 
contradiction here. Tilling is talking about an entity gaining legitimacy by dealing with the 
society as a whole; these dealings may not be with organisations within the same field or 
industry. Equally, Di Maggio and Powell (1983) do not mention the entities within an 
organisational field dealing with each other. They broach the idea that ‘powerful forces’ 
created by society will cause the isomorphism. So Legitimacy Theory is concerned with the 
idea that organisations can gain legitimacy by their interaction with other members of the 
society. The main form of interaction is the financial reporting by the entity. This idea 
indicates that the managers are trying to create and maintain the entity’s legitimacy. On the 
other hand Institutional Theory emphasises that the society is using Di Maggio and Powell’s 
‘powerful forces’ to influence and mould the entity. 
 
When we consider this we can argue that under Legitimacy Theory we have the business 
entities in an active role. The managers are attempting to create legitimacy; it is a deliberate 
action on the part of the managers (Deegan 2006). With Institutional Theory we have the 
business organisations in a more passive role with society’s forces acting upon them. Dillard 
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Rigsby & Goodman (2004, p 508) are referring to this point when they state that there are 
‘social processes through which these structures develop’. 
 
However, even with this active/passive view of the two theories there is still one common 
point. In both theories there is the idea that business entities are only going to survive if they 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of the society in which they function. 
 
From all this we can conclude that Institutional Theory is related to Legitimacy Theory in that 
both theories are concerned with an entity’s gaining and maintaining of legitimacy. However, 
each of the theories looks at the phenomenon from different perspectives. 
 
Legitimacy Theory is concerned with how the directors of an organisation create and maintain 
legitimacy through their voluntary reporting. The directors are therefore taking an active role 
in this creation process. 
 
Institutional Theory is concerned with society’s pressures that are exerted on an entity, 
pressures that force it to conform to belief systems and rules of operation. As the entity is 
moulded into the form wanted by the society it is seen by the society as having legitimacy. 
The entity has, therefore, a more passive role in the process of isomorphism. 
These pressures can apply even to governments. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) discuss social 
pressures on state governments in U.S.A. in their choice of accounting procedures. In their 
conclusion Carpenter and Feroz (2001) predict that ‘all state governments in the U.S.A. will 
eventually bow to institutional pressures for change and adopt GAAP for external financial 
reporting’ (p. 593). They go on to say that they ‘identified coercive and normative isomorphic 
pressures as potent forces for GAAP adoption’ (p.593). These isomorphic pressures are two 
of the ‘powerful forces’ identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and referred to earlier in 
this thesis. 
 
It can therefore be argued that this active/passive dichotomy is, to some extent, two was of 
viewing the same point, viz. that businesses need legitimacy in the eyes of their society to 
remain operational. 
 
When we relate this to the nineteenth century railway companies we can see that those 
companies constituted what Di Maggio and Powell (1983) called an organisational field. 
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But were there ‘powerful forces’ applied by society to the railway companies? Di Maggio and 
Powell (1983) argued that these forces make companies within an organisational field similar 
to each other. 
 
A review of the history of the railway companies (Edwards, 1985; Edwards, 1986; Parker, 
1990) reveals that the main influences on the development of the Double Account System 
were (i) the need to comply with legislation and (ii) the need to provide shareholders with a 
calculation of distributable profits. 
 
The first influence is actually a legal requirement. This raises the question of whether or not a 
requirement created by legislation can be said to be a social force. In chapter four of this 
thesis the idea of accounting being a tool used by society was raised. A follow on from that 
discussion is that a legislative requirement is a social force. The requirement is put in place 
through legislation by the government which is the body to which authority to create laws is 
passed by members of the society (Hobbes, 2012). 
In this way the nineteenth century railway companies were subject to social influence, or 
pressures, as described by Di Maggio and Powell (1983). 
 
However, it can also be argued that the legislation referred to in this thesis only placed on the 
railway companies a restriction as to the use of its capital. This requirement predates the 
mandatory use of the Double Account System (Edwards, 1985). The early legislation was 
silent on the subject of reporting this use. However, the principle of stewardship and 
accountability discussed in chapter four of this thesis argues that the companies developed the 
Double Account System partly in response to this requirement. It is therefore arguable that 
pressures from society were indirectly responsible for the creation of the Double Account 
System that came to be used by all railway companies before it became mandatory (Edwards 
1985; Parker 1990).  
 
The second point mentioned above, the need to report to shareholders, is more of the nature of 
the entities seeking legitimacy rather than a social force. However, it can be argued that the 
expectation of the shareholders (i.e. that they wanted to know the distributable profit) was a 
social force that influenced the directors. One can argue that the director were aware of this 
requirement and included a calculation of total distributable profit in response. It may also be 
argued that this action by the directors is also in line with Stakeholder Theory. 
70 
 
 
It may be argued that ‘reverse legitimacy’ (Diaz 2009) may have been a feature of the history 
of the railway companies. An examination of the financial report in appendix one of this 
thesis shows that the Capital Account is actually overdrawn. According to Railway Maps and 
Documents, in March 1839 The London and Birmingham Railway had overspent its capital 
by £631,000, funding the deficit by other borrowings and debts. The company then applied to 
the government for permission to raise an additional £1,000,000 to cover the shortfall.  
Railway Maps and Documents notes that ‘parliament was hardly able to refuse and allow the 
endeavour to fail’. 
 
It is also important to note that there is little evidence of social pressures from the public on 
the railway companies in the historical literature. Edwards (1985) does report that early 
legislative attempts to control the reporting of the railway entities were unsuccessful. He 
states that between 1949 and 1851 there were three Bills presented in Parliament that were 
designed to control railway financial reports. The first, in 1849, proposed, inter alia, a 
Government audit of the railway companies.  A delegation of railway directors persuaded the 
Government to withdraw the Bill in exchange for a promise that the railway companies would 
take actions about audits themselves.  A second railway audit Bill was presented to 
Parliament in 1850. This Bill was defeated in the House as was a similar Bill in 1851 
(Edwards 1985). However, these defeats were not because of ‘reverse legitimacy’ as 
described by Diaz (2009); rather it was mainly because of the conflict of interest between the 
legislators and shareholders of the railway companies who were often the same people 
(Edwards 1985). 
 
These legislative attempts to control the reporting of the railway entities could be seen as 
social pressures exerted on those entities. However, we must remember that these attempts 
were unsuccessful. The introduction of the bills to Parliament may indicate that social 
pressures did exist. But whatever pressure there may have been it was not enough to persuade 
members of parliament to support the proposals. Of the three bills mentioned above one was 
withdrawn after pressure was applied by a delegation of railway directors. The other two were 
defeated in the House (Edwards 1985). It can therefore be said that the pressure to pass these 
bills was not strong enough to overcome the influence of the railway directors or the conflict 
of interest referred to in the previous paragraph of this thesis. 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter has examined modern accounting theories, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder 
Theory and Institutional Theory. The reasons for the selection of these particular theories 
were provided in section 1.3.2 of this thesis. 
These theories are described as systems oriented (Gray, Owen & Adams 1996). These 
theories are concerned with non-mandatory reporting and are based on the assumption that 
businesses are part of society and interact with other members of that society. 
Deegan (2006) described Legitimacy Theory as showing how entities operate within bounds 
and norms of their society. Deegan (2006) also stated that these bounds and norms change 
over time so that something acceptable in one period may not be acceptable in another. 
Tilling (2004) described Legitimacy Theory as having two layers: Institutional and 
Organisational. The Institutional layer is concerned with an entity’s interaction with society as 
a whole. The Organisational layer is concerned with how entities deal with each other. 
Lindblom (1993) described legitimacy as a perception. That is, it is the perception of the 
organisation held by society. Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) and Deegan (2006), however, 
described legitimacy as a resource and stated that businesses were constantly trying to gain 
and maintain their legitimacy. 
Lindblom (1993) also pointed out that legitimacy may not always be gained simply by 
obeying the law. There can be discrepancies between the law and the expectations of society 
so merely obeying the law will not necessarily create legitimacy for a business. 
Stakeholder Theory is seen as being closely related to Legitimacy Theory. Deegan (2006) 
stated that to consider one without considering the other would be a mistake. 
Both of these theories are concerned with legitimacy but view the process of gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy from a different angle. 
Stakeholder Theory has two branches. The Ethical branch assumes that all stakeholders are 
equally entitled to be treated fairly but an entity. The Managerial branch, however, assumes 
that managers do not treat all stakeholders the same (Deegan 2006). Gray, Owen and Adams 
(1996) state that organisations treat various stakeholders differently and the treatment will 
depend on the importance of the stakeholder as perceived by the organisation’s managers. 
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Institutional Theory is concerned with how businesses conform to certain beliefs, practices 
and norms and in the process become similar to each other. This theory is concerned with the 
pressures put on organisations by society to conform (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Scott 
1987; Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman 2004). This theory is also related to legitimacy but sees 
the organisations in a more passive role that the other two theories. Riaz (2009) argued that 
this pressure from society can be reversed if organisations become powerful enough within 
their society. 
When we consider all this we can say that the three theories examined by this thesis are all 
concerned with the gaining and maintaining of legitimacy. The main difference between the 
theories is that Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory view the businesses as being 
actively engaged in the efforts to create and maintain legitimacy. Institutional Theory views 
the businesses as being in a passive role with society exerting influence on them to conform. 
How these points relate to the nineteenth century British railway companies will be examined 
in chapter six of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis is an attempt to discover if it is feasible to examine events in history through the 
lens of modern accounting theories. 
To do this, the study began with a brief description of the coming of the British railways in 
the nineteenth century, their growth and their collapse in the mid-1840s. 
The thesis then looked at the social aspects of accounting. That chapter concluded that 
accounting is not just a measuring tool but has become a social instrument with which society 
can regulate the financial reports of reporting entities. This regulation is needed because those 
entities are not just reporting to themselves, as they used to do before the Industrial 
Revolution. They report to society as a whole. This includes present and potential 
shareholders, government authorities, taxation authorities and other interested parties. 
Because this work is not a history thesis but an accounting thesis, the study concentrated on 
the accounting system used by the railway companies in question. That is, the Double 
Account System. The thesis examined its development and, especially, its workings. In doing 
so, the shortcomings of the system became apparent. At the time of the collapse of the railway 
companies the accounting system in use had not fully evolved from being a simple 
measurement tool to that of being a social instrument. It can be argued that this slowness to 
evolve to increasing reporting requirements played a role in the collapse of the railways. 
The study then examined several accounting theories with the aim of exploring the possible 
linkage between them and their usefulness in allowing a fresh examination of the role 
accounting might have played in the collapse of these railway companies. 
The theories examined are Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory. 
The study found that they are all connected by the concept of legitimacy. It is legitimacy that 
causes the overlap described by Deegan (2006). 
The three theories are concerned with: 
 An organisation attempting to generate legitimacy for itself by conforming to norms 
and beliefs of the society in which the firm operates. This is Legitimacy Theory, as 
described by Lindblom (1993) and Tilling (2004). 
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 An organisation coming to see that certain stakeholders are more important to them 
than others. This attitude results in the managers of the organisation acting so as to 
satisfy those stakeholders perceived needs. This is the managerial limb of Stakeholder 
Theory as described by Deegan (2006) and Gray, Owen and Adams (1996). 
 An organisation seeing all stakeholders as important and that they should be 
considered equally when seeking legitimacy.  This is the ethical limb of Stakeholder 
Theory (Deegan 2006). 
 Organisations having influence put on them by society to conform to norms and 
beliefs. This is Institutional Theory as described by Di Maggio and Powell (1983). By 
conforming, the entity gains legitimacy. This sees the firms in a more passive role than 
the other two theories. 
The study also found that the approval being sought by entities cannot come from all of 
society. Lindblom (1983) states that this universal approval is usually impossible to achieve. 
Rather, firms develop relationships with the stakeholders that they view as being the most 
relevant to their aim of gaining legitimacy. 
Carpenter and Feroz provided examples of the importance of legitimacy (Carpenter and Feroz 
1992; 2001). In their 1992 paper they reported that the U.S. state of New York needed to 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to obtain access to finance markets. 
This is an example of an organisation seeking legitimacy. In Carpenter and Feroz (2001) the 
authors cite three other U.S. states who had also adopted GAAP for similar reasons to New 
York State. The authors describe this as Institutional Theory at work in the gaining of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the finance markets.  
The link between the theories and the history is that if we view history as just a series of 
events we may have difficulty understanding how the events evolved. Historians must put the 
events into their context. When accountants look at the history of the railways from the 
accounting perspective we gain a clearer view of the events if we consider them through the 
lens of modern accounting theories. 
The thesis shows that the Double Account System evolved from the accounting of the canal 
companies to be used by the railway companies. Edwards (1985) makes the point that the 
railway companies had to comply with the law and account for their stewardship of the funds 
invested by shareholders and debenture holders. If we say that the railway directors were 
trying to gain legitimacy by complying with the law we could conclude that the Double 
Account System did achieve this aim. But Lindblom (1983) states that merely complying with 
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the law is usually not enough to obtain legitimacy. This is because there may be a gap 
between the law and what society or stakeholders expect. It is therefore arguable that the 
Double Account System was not successful in gaining legitimacy in this instance despite its 
compliance with the law. 
In relation to the railway companies’ efforts in reporting to equity holders we can say that the 
companies provided the shareholders and lenders with information concerning distributable 
profits. This can be seen as gaining legitimacy from this group of stakeholders. However, the 
question of why the collapse came about then arises. 
Odlyzko calls the railway collapse a bubble (Odlyzko 2010). Campbell (2009) concurs. He 
also states that the share price followed the dividends. That is, when dividends dropped, so 
did the share price. So, it can be argued, the railway directors kept the dividends high to keep 
the share prices high. But if the reported distributable profits were questionable, which they 
appear to have been, according to this thesis, the dividends could not be maintained. 
The idea that distributable profits were questionable and that dividends could not be 
maintained is covered in sections 4.5 and 4.6 of this thesis. 
If a profit is calculated on a cash basis as described by Edwards (1985) the scope for 
manipulation of the reported profit is very wide. Not only are creditors ignored but any costs 
or expenses can be pushed to subsequent accounting periods simply by delaying their 
payment. If the entirety of the resultant overstated profit is distributed as dividends (Edwards 
1985) then those dividends are clearly coming out of capital. 
There seems little doubt about the erosion of capital arising from the situation described here. 
Bryer (1991) points out that the Monteagle Committee commented on dividends being paid 
out of capital in its 1849 report. Bryer’s discussion of the report of the committee in relation 
to dividends indicates that the practice was not doubted. Rather, the committee was concerned 
with the fact that the financial statements did not make it clear to the reader that dividends 
came from any source other than profits. 
Assuming that the Monteagle Committee is correct on this point (Bryer raises no question in 
this regard) then the dividends being paid must come out of profits and capital. An erosion of 
capital clearly cannot continue without the said capital being added to by a further issue of 
shares. But, as pointed out by Bryer (1991) and Odlyzko (2010) the directors had to maintain 
a high dividend to attract new investors. This results in a vicious circle that only ends when 
the bubble, as described by Odlyzko (2010) and Campbell (2009) finally bursts. 
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This questions whether the railway directors were trying to gain legitimacy by paying large 
dividends. Or was the payment of dividends simply a way to keep the share price high. The 
directors were shareholders, too and they needed the railway companies to be seen as good 
investments when they needed additional capital. 
It is also important to note that we are not in a position to know what the directors had in 
mind when they were designing the financial reports. Whether they were concerned with 
seeking legitimacy or simply with complying with the law and calculating profits can only be 
assumed by looking at the reports they produced. Edwards (1985), in writing a purely 
historical investigation, does not comment on or assert that there had been any pursuit of the 
creation of legitimacy by the railway directors. This does not necessarily mean that the 
directors were not concerned with the concept. All that can be said with certainty is that there 
is no evidence in the financial statements to suggest that they were so concerned. 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis does not claim to be the result of an exhaustive investigation into the matters 
raised by the research questions put forward in section 1.2.4 of this work. 
Such an investigation would require an extensive examination of British historical documents 
not readily available to a writer operating in Australia. (Many documents are available on the 
internet, but not all.) Such a search may reveal more about the intentions of the railway 
directors and their motivations in preparing financial statements in the format that we now 
see. 
The work is also prepared from the perspective of an accountant. A professional historian may 
hold a different opinion as to the answer to the first research question. This does not mean that 
only one of the answers is correct. There is no definitive answer to the question; there is only 
an opinion as to the feasibility of the suggestion raised in the question. The thesis presents a 
case from an accountant’s point of view. A historian may present an equally well (or better) 
argued case that supports a different but equally valid conclusion. 
Equally true is that accountant or accounting historian may come to a different conclusion in 
relation to the second question. 
The result of these differing opinions may be that we are reminded that a view of history is 
often as much subjective as it is objective. 
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With this in mind we can say that in presenting an accountant’s considered opinion as to the 
answers to the research questions the writer is also inviting others to put forward their 
answers to the problems raised in this study. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Subject to the limitations outlined above, it is concluded that this thesis has met its Research 
Objective and answered its Research Questions.  
In relation to the Research Objective as stated in section 1.2.4 of this thesis, the work has 
shown that using modern systems oriented accounting theories can help to clarify our picture 
of the historical events examined in this thesis. The extent to which these theories assist us in 
viewing history is limited but historic events are seen more clearly if we view them with the 
theories in mind.  
We can conclude the following in relation to the thesis’s Research Questions. 
 It is feasible to use modern systems oriented accounting theories to investigate and 
help explain historical events provided we view the events from an accountant’s 
perspective. 
 The Double Account System had two aims: comply with the legislation and report to 
equity holders in relation to distributable profits. The system succeeded in the former 
but Lindblom (1993) states that this will not necessarily create legitimacy for a 
company. The system succeeded in the short term with the latter aim but the desire to 
keep dividends high meant that the profit and, therefore, the dividends and share price, 
could not be sustained. In the long term the Double Account System can be seen as a 
failure in this aim. As a financial reporting system, it did not adequately identify and 
communicate information that presented a realistic picture of the ongoing viability of 
the railway companies. 
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Appendix One 
 
 
 
Published Accounts of the London and Birmingham Railway, 
 
6 Months to 31 December 1838 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Edwards, J 1985, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Double Account System: An Example of 
Accounting Innovation’ Abacus, vol. 21, no.1, 1985, pp. 32, 33. 
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